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1. The Issue 
 
Concern about the rate at which the world’s forests are being depleted is wide-
spread. Recent international calls for radical efforts to reduce deforestation include 
the United Nations Inter-governmental Forum on Forests of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development (1999), and the World Commission on Forests and 
Sustainable Development (1999). This concern reflects an appreciation of the 
ecological and economic functions of forests: as providers of timber and many 
non-timber predicts, as the habitat for much of the world’s biological diversity, 
and as regulators of local, regional and global environments. These functions are 
at risk. Most of the forest clearance is in areas of high forest cover and high 
human population pressure in tropical areas for agriculture. In temperate and 
boreal areas the pressures from logging are more important. But in all areas, 
forestry itself has an important role to play both as a partial cause of deforestation, 
and, if practiced wisely, as a potential source of salvation for at least some of the 
world’s forests. In terms of its causal role, forestry tends to open up primary forest 
areas, enabling colonists to move in, using roads forged by the timber companies. 
In some parts of the world, forests are converted not to agriculture but to biomass 
plantations of fast growing trees or to other agro-industries based on tree-crop 
plantations such as palm oil and rubber.  Here the primary agent is not the peasant, 
but the richer elements of local and international society. 
 
How, then, can the world’s forests be used more wisely? It is this admittedly 
grand and complex question that we seek to answer in this chapter. Some argue 
for outright protection, caricatured perhaps in the phrase ‘fence and forget’. Others 
argue for ‘sustainable forest management’, and still others for systems of forest 
management that rely on acceptance of an initial period of exploitation of valuable 
species followed by outright protection. The issue, then, is the optimal use of 
forested land
1, which begs the question of what is meant by ‘optimal’. This is 
addressed shortly.  
                                                 
1 We use the term forested land rather than forest land to make it clear that we are dealing with 
land that still has forest on it, rather than land which has a potential to be used for forest in one 
form or another. 
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Forested land may be retained as forest or it may be converted to non-forest uses 
such as crop agriculture, livestock, and urban expansion, or to industrial tree 
crops. The first question, then, is under what circumstances it is better to convert 
forest land to non-forest uses, and when not. If it can be shown that forest  land is 
best retained as forest - where ‘best’ needs to defined (see below) - the further 
issue arises of what kind of  forestry is to be preferred.. Here the issue is clouded 
in terminological confusion because the words used in reference to forestry have 
come to mean different things to different people. But, in order to focus the debate 
we choose three archetypes familiar in the literature: conventional logging (CL), 
sustainable timber management (STM) and sustainable forest management 
(SFM). We adopt this terminology not because we think it is free from 
misinterpretation, but because the literature on the role of forestry in deforestation 
has adopted it, making it extremely difficult to elicit the lessons from that 
literature without using that language. We devote some time to explaining what 
we mean by the terms below and why, in an ideal world, we would prefer a 
different terminology. For the moment, we take CL to be more short-term in 
focus, less concerned with forest regeneration through management, and often 
lacking in government control. We take STM to be a forest management system 
that aims for sustained timber yields. We take SFM to be a system of forest 
management that aims for sustained yields of multi-products from the forest. 
 
There have been recent challenges to the idea that conservation is best served 
through sustainable timber or forest management (Bowles et al., 1998; Vincent, 
1992; Kishor and Constantino, 1993; Howard et al, 1996; Rice et al, 1997). One 
argument is that conservation can only be served by outright protection (Bowles et 
al., 1998), i.e. while SFM has the potential for protection, it is inferior to outright 
protection. Another view is that conservation might be better served by an initial 
period of well managed logging followed by protection (Rice et al., 1998a;  Rice 
et al., 1998b; Cannon et al., 1998). Against this, it is argued that outright protect-
ion has an extremely limited chance of being successful in face of the high costs 
of protection, the need to use forests for profit, and human  population growth: in 
many places sustainable forestry management offers the only chance of 
maintaining forests and biodiversity (Whitmore, 1999). 
 
 
2. The Theme 
 
In terms of the debate about the optimal use of forested lands, the existing 
literature tends to focus on the financial returns from STM, SFM and CL and on 
physical descriptions of the comparative ecological impact profiles of these forms 
of forest use management. The focus on financial returns is justified in so far as 
actual forest use is determined by relative profits. The focus on ecological impact 
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profiles is relevant for a full economic assessment. An economic assessment 
makes three potentially major adjustments to a financial analysis: the existing 
financial costs and benefits are adjusted to ‘shadow values’ to reflect the true 
opportunity cost of the resources involved; and environmental and social costs and 
benefits (‘externalities’) are included both at the national level, and at the global 
level.  
 
(1) The first modification adjusts financial costs and benefits to reflect shadow 
prices. A shadow price, say the price of labour or the exchange rate, differs 
from a financial price in that it reflects the true opportunity cost of the 
resources in question. As an instance, the ruling wage rate would be used in 
a financial analysis, but if the labour employed would otherwise be un-
employed, the shadow wage rate will tend to be closer to zero (since the 
wage in alternative employment is, effectively, zero). A shadow exchange 
rate is the rate that would prevail if trade was free and open, rather than, as 
is often the case,  managed through trade quotas and tariffs. It is important 
to understand that this shift to shadow pricing alters the stakeholder 
perspective. Whereas financial costs and benefits are relevant to the logger 
or concessionaire, shadow priced costs and benefits are relevant from the 
standpoint of the forest owning nation. 
 
(2) The second modification adds in all environmental and social consequences 
which affect the wellbeing of anyone within the nation. Thus, if indigenous 
peoples are adversely affected by the forest development, their wellbeing 
must be counted in any economic study. Similarly, if logging gives rise to 
soil erosion, loss of flood control, loss of biodiversity, etc., an economic 
analysis would attempt to take these into account. It is important to 
understand that ecological functions of forests have a parallel in economic 
magnitudes – all ecological functions are economic functions. 
 
(3) The third modification  constitutes a global analysis and would additionally 
include the gains and losses of people outside the country in which the 
forest is located. Thus, if individuals in another country experience a loss of 
wellbeing from knowing that deforestation, perhaps indirectly caused 
through logging, is taking place, that loss of wellbeing has also to be 
accounted for. This loss of wellbeing is relevant regardless of whether it 
emanates from a loss of any use value (e.g. ecotourism, or carbon storage ) 
or any loss of non-use value, i.e. wellbeing unassociated with any direct use 
of the forest. 
 
It is not always appreciated that economic analysis is potentially quite different to 
financial analysis. An economic analysis might, for example, sanction an activity 
that is wholly unprofitable from a financial standpoint. 
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In this chapter we try to build up the overall picture, as best we can, by beginning 
with financial analysis and extending it to full global economic assessment. It is 
important to understand that a global economic assessment is useful only in so far 
as it demonstrates the superiority of one form of forest land use over another, i.e. 
it shows, in an accounting sense, which land use is ‘best’. Unless there are 
corresponding cash flows which capture those values, the exercise remains 
interesting but unlikely to cause changes in the way  forests are treated. For 
example, SFM may turn out to be financially inferior to CL, but this does not 
mean that SFM is to be dismissed. An economic analysis that includes all social 
and environmental externalities can guide us to the relevant conclusion. Now 
suppose the economic analysis demonstrates that SFM is superior to CL, regard-
less of the contrary finding for the financial analysis. Since the financial costs and 
benefits ‘drive’ the land use decision, SFM can only be introduced if forest land 
use is regulated in some way, or if forest land users are compensated for the 
difference between the profits under CL and the profits under SFM. In this chapter 
we are concerned mainly with the demonstration phase. The broad issue of 
designing compensatory and ‘capture’ incentives is not addressed in detail here 
except indirectly by reference to the literature, e.g. Pearce (1996), Panayotou and 
Ashton (1992).  Capture mechanisms include debt-for-nature swaps, carbon 
trading, forest certification and so on. 
 
3. The Terminology of Forest Management 
 
As noted above, the terminology used in the debate over the appropriate use of 
forested land has become confusing.   
 
‘Logging’ rightly refers to the process of harvesting timber from a forest, but 
whereas timber harvesting appears ‘value-neutral’, logging has come to be 
regarded as necessarily destructive  and evoking the picture of huge clear-cuts on 
steep slopes. Logging, however, can be a legitimate part of good  or ‘wise’ forest 
management.  In the same way, the literature now refers to ‘conventional logging’ 
as if it too characterises undesirable treatment of forest. To a forester, however, 
conventional logging might characterise standard forest management practice as 
opposed to unconventional means of timber extraction, e.g. with the use of 
helicopters. But some conventional logging is not practiced wisely, so that it 
becomes possible to contrast poor management practice with, say, reduced impact 
logging (RIL). To a forester, RIL would simply be a feature of any good manage-
ment system. In what follows we maintain the more popular image of 
conventional logging as meaning use of the forest for short-term timber supplies, 
aimed solely at short-term profits and without significant government control. 
Management plans may or may not exist for this type of timber harvesting, and, 
while the potential is there for switching to a more long-term sustained timber 
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yield, it is more likely that forest degradation, forest loss and conversion to non-
forest use will follow.  
 
In terms of timber volumes, conventional timber harvesting may be sustainable or 
unsustainable. But the connotation of conventional logging is that it is often 
unsustainable, i.e. not focused on long term timber supplies. Sustainable timber 
management (STM) therefore arises when a forest management plan is fully 
implemented for timber is fully implemented and focuses on the long term. Note 
that the sustained  yield does not necessarily mean that one species is sustained 
over time. As the forest structure and composition change over time because of 
harvesting or natural succession, harvested species may change. 
 
Sustainable forest management embraces the view of the forest as yielding many 
different products and providing many different ecological services. Sustainable 
forest management will therefore produce an array of products and services which 
may or may not include timber. SFM  therefore relates to the multiple use of the 
forest. To a forester, the term ‘management’ could relate to the management of 
resources, inventorying  and yield calculation, and to silvicultural practice (e.g. 
climber cutting), so that, on some definitions, SFM is already embodied in good 
practice timber harvesting. Again, then, the terminology of SFM is not ideal but is 
retained here to convey the idea of multi-product uses and with a focus on the 
longer term. 
‘Protection’ is also ambiguous. For ardent environmentalists it almost certainly 
means the maintenance of the structure and composition of the forest without 
change caused by human intervention. For others it risks being confused with 
‘conservation’ which is the proper management of the forest for the sustained 
yield of some product(s), service(s), or some combination of products and 
services. Again, a forester would argue that he or she has always been in the 
business of conservation in this sense (as indicated by the more traditional term of 
‘conservator’).  ‘Protection’ also conjures up the image of leaving a forest totally 
alone when, in practice, some management of invasive exotic species, fire etc. is 
still likely to be required to conserve structure and composition.  If so, it would 
appear that private interests will not result in protection because it yields no return 
but does involve costs such as monitoring, fencing etc. In practice, private 
interests may well engage in protection since private benefits can accrue from 
conservation of the carbon content of the forest – see Section 8.5 - and protection 
may be consistent with some uses of the protected forest, e.g. ecotourism. 
 
Clearly, the language in the forest debate has varying interpretations. We attempt 
a typology in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Typology of Forest Uses 
 
 Short-term Long-term 
 
Timber Timber Multiple 
purpose 
Composition 
and structure 
Poorly 
managed 
Conventional 
logging: short-
term timber 
supplies, gener-
ally unsupervised 
   
 
Well 
Managed 
 
Reduced impact 
logging, probably 
supervised 
 
Sustainable 
timber manage-
ment: long term 
sustained 
multiple benefits 
 
Sustainable 
forest manage-
ment: long 
term sustained 
multiple 
benefits  
 
‘Protection’: 
probably 
involving 
some 
management 
 
 
4. The Meaning of ‘Optimal’ Forest Land Use 
 
What is ‘optimal’ depends on the viewpoint of the economic agent making the 
decision to convert forest land or to adopt a particular forestry regime. Hence we 
need to identify the stakeholders.  
 
From the standpoint of most logging companies a forest exists to be logged. In 
principle, a forest will not be logged if it is unprofitable to do so, although it is 
perfectly feasible that loggers may log land at a loss if subsidies prevail. If the 
forest is profitable, the management regime used will generally be that which 
maximises profits, subject to any regulations on harvesting that may be in place. 
In addition to obligations under relevant legislation, logging companies may 
voluntarily attenuate maximum profits if they feel some obligation towards the 
environment. In some cases it would appear that the most profitable regime is not 
employed. RIL might, for example, lower costs but not be used, perhaps because 
of ignorance or for reasons that remain unclear. 
 
Forest owners include local communities, indigenous groups, non-logging 
companies and individuals. In these cases there may be a mix of motives with 
regard to the forest: as a supplier of products, including timber; as an environ-
mental resource; as a stewardship objective, and so on. 
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From the standpoint of forest dwellers a forest exists to provide an array of 
ecological and economic functions ranging from timber, fuelwood, and wildmeat 
to protection against floods.  
 
From the standpoint of poor agricultural colonists forests exist for the land they 
provide for timber, crops and livestock, mainly the latter two. The productivity of 
this land is temporarily advanced through burning and clearance, and may be 
more permanently advanced by the use of inputs such as fertiliser. Such colonists 
may nonetheless have complex mixes of motives. Thus, Mourato and Parikh 
(1999) show that slash and burn cultivators in Peru exhibit a strong concern for 
the conservation values of their forests. The image of colonists as being poor is 
not always correct: they may also be wealthy individuals or companies looking to 
exploit subsidies, to speculate on land values, or to anticipate conversion to 
lucrative plantations and agro-industries.  
 
From the standpoint of the conservationist the forest exists to provide ecological 
functions, amenity and the provision of wellbeing to forest peoples. Motivations 
vary and may range from a desire to make direct use of the forest (e.g. ecotourism) 
to a concern for the intrinsic rights of biodiversity to exist. 
 
From the standpoint of national governments, forests may serve any of the above 
functions depending on the extent to which governments have the wellbeing of 
particular stakeholders at heart. They may prefer : 
 
• logging to preservation because it provides employment and tax income;  
 
• conversion because it may yield higher returns than timber production; 
 
• conversion and colonisation because of the need to ‘establish’ political 
frontiers and accommodate migrants; 
 
• conservation because of a concern for vulnerable indigenous groups, 
because of the potential income from sustainable uses of the forest, 
because there are financial inducements to conserve, or because they 
have forest protection as a general social objective.  
 
From the standpoint of the world as a whole there may be a preference to log 
forests for the valuable timber they contain, or to conserve forests for their local 
and global ecological functions. In the latter case, there may be a preference to 
conserve forests because of their role in providing biodiversity and in storing 
carbon which would otherwise be released to the atmosphere, contributing to 
global warming. The relevant agents reflecting ‘world’ interests include some 
activities by bilateral and multinational aid agencies, various UN organizations not 
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directly involved with aid, the Global Environment Facility, and international 
NGOs. 
 
The viewpoints of the stakeholders necessarily conflict, otherwise there would be 
no ‘forest problem’.  Different uses of forested land are often incompatible. There 
are only two options for ‘resolving’ these conflicts of values. The first is to impose 
a given use on all stakeholders, regardless of the differences of viewpoint. This 
‘solution’ is potentially unstable because one or more stakeholders will lose from 
the imposed land use. Hence they have a continuing incentive to break the 
agreement by securing its subsequent rejection, or by ‘illegally’ using the forest 
for their own purposes. The second is to find an agreement which adopts a given 
use of the forest land and in which those who lose are compensated in some way 
for forgoing their use of the land. On this solution, all stakeholders are (ideally) 
better off with the agreed land use than they were without it. 
 
The second solution suggests the meaning of ‘optimal’: it is a land use which is 
judged socially the most beneficial overall, but in which those who lose from the 
land use are compensated for their losses. This definition accords with elementary 
game theory (for a brief introduction see Perman et al., 1999). 
 
In practice, actual compensation for losses is often not feasible. At the very least 
then, forest land should be allocated to those uses which maximise, as far as 
possible, the aggregate social value of the forest land. If gains and losses are 
measured in monetary terms, then this requirement is equivalent to a standard 
cost-benefit analysis approach and the compensation is potential rather than 
actual. Put another way, gainers have to be able to compensate losers and still 
have net gains to show (Pearce, 1986). In practice, while we may not be able to 
assign economic values to all functions, the cost-benefit approach is a reasonable 
way of organising the framework for analysis.  
 
A convenient language to describe stakeholders’ interests is that of ‘private’ and 
‘social’ gains and losses. ‘Private’ refers to the private interests of the stakeholder, 
i.e. what benefits him or her. ‘Social’ takes the wider, social perspective and the 
jurisdiction may be local, national, regional or global. In theory, governments or 
global agencies should take the social standpoint, but it is well known that this is 
not always the case. Both perspectives are relevant to determining ‘optimal’ forest 
land use because adopting a social perspective without acknowledging that some 
stakeholders’ private interests may be compromised will, as noted above, be 
potentially unstable. For an overview of conflicts in forest land use see Chapter 7 
of Panayotou and Ashton (1992). 
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Table 1: Motivations for stakeholder preferences for forest land use 
 
 
Motivations for land use preference by stakeholder 
 Conversion -
agriculture 
Conversion -
other 
CL SFM Protection 
Logger 
 
 
 
Profit if 
CL>SFM 
Profit if 
SFM>CL 
 
Forest dweller    Timber and NTFPs  
Owner (other  
than 
government) 
Profit Profit Profit if 
CL>SFM 
Profit if SFM>CL,  
or non-market 
benefits of SFM 
Stewardship 
motives 
Colonist 
(poor and rich) 
Profit Profit Profit May log more 
sustainably 
Possible? 
Conservationis
t 
  Timber and 
NTFPs if RIL 
Timber and NTFPs 
if SFM ⇒ 
Protection 
Ecological 
benefits 
Government 
 
Employment 
Migration 
Border 
security 
Employment 
Border 
security 
Roads 
Tax revenues 
Timber and 
NTFPs if CL ⇒ 
Protection 
Tax revenues 
Timber and NTFPs 
if SFM ⇒ 
Protection 
Ecological 
benefits 
World 
 
  Timber and 
NTFPs if CL ⇒ 
Protection 
Timber and NTFPs 
especially carbon 
benefits. 
Ecological 
benefits, 
especially 
carbon and 
biodiversity 
Note: NTFP = non timber forest products 
 
Table 1 encapsulates the different interests of the forest stakeholders, albeit in 
simplistic terms. The reality is that motivations will often be complex mixes of 
those shown. 
 
Figure 2 shows competing and complementary forest land uses in diagrammatic 
form. Note that conventional logging (CL) is potentially capable of leading to 
protection if well managed logging occurs in an initial period after which loggers 
leave the area and protective policies are introduced. CL is also, however, linked 
to conversion since the initial period of logging opens up the forest area to 
colonists and industrial uses through the construction of roads. Which of these 
views is correct is an empirical matter. CL could, in principle, also lead to STM if 
initial-phase loggers focus on only large specimens, collateral damage is 
minimised and regeneration is fast. STM, of course, also opens up the forest and 
relies for its avoidance of colonisation and conversion on the management of the 
forest for longer-term purposes. In practice, CL followed by STM/SFM seems 
unlikely due to soil and biomass damage in the CL phase.  Nonetheless, we retain 
the possibility of the sequence from CL to STM/SFM. 
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Figure 2: Forest land use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The Meaning of Sustainable Forest Management 
 
Optimal land use is not necessarily the same thing as sustainable land use (Toman 
and Ashton, 1994)2. The current debate about forestry is partly about sustain-
ability, i.e. about making use of forested land in a sustainable fashion. In large 
part, converting forest land to agriculture – in tropical regions – is not sustainable 
because soils often do not have the capacity to sustain agricultural activity 
indefinitely, although the case for perennials is far stronger in this respect. There 
are, however, many cases in which tropical forests have been converted and 
successful agriculture follows (see e.g. Schneider, 1995). In other cases, provided 
suitable fallow periods prevail, forested land can be converted for short term 
                                                 
2 Optimality tends to be defined in terms of maximising the net present value (NPV) of the flow 
of services from the forest resource.  Because of discounting, it may be possible to maximise 
NPV from very short  term exploitation of the forest even if high economic values are attached 
to long term benefits. Sustainable uses, on the other hand, may yield short term gains below 
those of exploitative uses, but which extend into the indefinite future. Discounting the yields 
over an infinite time horizon may nonetheless result in the short term use being favoured. On  
the contrast between optimality and sustainability see Pearce (1999). 
OPTIMAL 
LAND USE 
CONVERSION 
NON-
CONVERSIO
Non 
agricultural
- 
plantation, 
Agricultura
l 
Convention
al logging 
or RIL 
Protection Sustainable 
forestry 
Crops 
Livestock 
STM 
SFM 
Vs 
STM 
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agricultural use and then be cleared again and reused after the fallow period. This 
’cycle’ of agriculture and forest regeneration is also potentially sustainable.  
 
As noted above, the debate about appropriate forestry mixes two different aspects 
of sustainability: sustainable timber management (STM) in which the focus is on a 
sustained yield of timber over long time periods; and sustainable forest 
management (SFM) in which the focus is on the many products and services of 
the forest sustained over long periods of time. While it is generally thought that 
STM is consistent with SFM, it is at least open to argument that STM will give a 
less sustainable flow of non-timber products relative to SFM. Thus, it is important 
to distinguish STM from SFM.  
 
In sustainable timber management, timber is extracted with regard to a continuous 
future supply of wood through investment in regeneration. STM also tends to be 
associated with minimisation of damage to residual stands, a point emphasised by 
Vanclay (1996), possible investment in finding uses for currently non-merchant-
able species, and accelerated growth of merchantable species in managed stands.  
 
With SFM, non-timber products and ecological services may also be exploited, 
e.g. through carbon trades, bio-prospecting, debt-for-nature swaps etc. Social uses 
of forest may also be taken into account (indigenous peoples). Thus SFM is: 
‘management of primary or secondary forests for the sustained production of 
timber or other products or both in which forest cover is maintained indefinitely’ 
(Dickinson et al., 1996). Reid and Rice (1997) suggest that the primary 
management objective of SFM is ‘obtaining a constant or increased flow of wood 
from a forest whose natural structure and species composition are maintained to 
some degree, though not entirely’, a definition that, nonetheless, interestingly 
makes no reference to ecosystem function or ecological processes. IFF (1999) 
state: ‘Non market forest goods and services and, moreover, cultural, spiritual and 
ethical values of forests are fundamental considerations of sustainable forest 
management. The importance of these contributions of forests should not be 
contested in principle, even if they cannot be denominated in monetary terms’. 
 
This quotation emphasises the view that SFM extends way beyond products and 
ecological services. Perhaps the most complete definition comes from Bruenig 
(1996): 
 ‘….management should aim at forest structures which keep the rainforest 
ecosystems as robust, elastic, versatile, adaptable, resistant, resilient and tolerant 
as possible; canopy openings should be kept within the limits of natural gap 
formation; stand and soil damage must be minimised; felling cycles must be 
sufficiently long and tree marking so designed that a selection forestry canopy 
structure and a self regulating stand table are maintained without, or with very 
little, silvicultural manipulation; production of timber should aim for  high quality 
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and versatility…..The basic principle is to mimic nature as closely as possible to 
make profitable use of the natural ecosystem dynamics and adaptability, and 
reduce costs and risks…’. 
 
6. The Context for the Analysis 
 
The context for the remainder of the chapter is one where the starting point is an 
existing forest. Thus, we do not discuss the optimal use of bare or degraded land.  
Additionally, although land uses that involve conversion of the forest are relevant 
to the analysis, they are incidental to the main focus which is on the appropriate 
form of forestry. It may or may not be the case that land conversion is socially or 
privately ‘better’ than a given forestry use. 
 
Finally, outright protection is also relevant to the analysis but is not the main 
focus. Like conversion, protection has to be part of the analysis because forest 
practices are capable of being a precursor to a protected area classification. 
Conventional logging, for example, is frequently a precursor to agricultural 
colonization, and hence land conversion. One current argument is that protection 
might follow on from an initial period of logging. The economics of this option 
depend in part on the economics of protection. It is widely thought that outright 
protection is expensive and ineffective. Hence ‘log and protect’ is not viable, 
whereas SFM might be. Bruner et al. (2001).suggest, however, that protection 
policies have been generally effective in preventing further land use change. 
Moreover, protection has not been expensive. There is also some evidence that 
conventional logging has not been as intensive as sustainable logging. Logging 
also reduces the financial value of subsequent logging, so that the opportunity cost 
of committing to conservation after a round of logging is correspondingly low. 
Clearly, there is room for considerable debate over the relative merits of SFM and 
the log-and-protect options. 
 
7. The Private Interests of the Logging Companies 
 
7.1 The empirical evidence 
From the logging firm’s point of view, the use of the forest will be dictated by the 
option providing the largest private financial rate of return. Empirical evidence 
relating to these rates of return is limited. The results of a literature search are 
given in Table 2. A particular problem concerns the fact that STM and SFM 
systems have rarely been in place long enough for an accurate picture on financial 
returns to be obtained (Dickinson et al., 1996). Furthermore, it is seldom to the 
logging firm’s advantage to reveal the actual costs of logging operations. Double 
accounting is therefore commonplace when record books are accessible at all.  
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Table 2: The financial profitability of STM/SFM and CL 
 
 
Study 
 
Country 
Type of 
forestry 
IRR, NPV 
(DR) 
Ratio profits 
CL to SFM 
 
Comment 
Bann, 1997 Cambodia STM, CL CL = $1,697 ha 
STM = $408 ha 
(6%) 
4.1 90 yr x 3 
cutting cycle 
for STM; 30 yr 
liquidation for 
CL 
Barreto et al, 
1998 
Brazil STM, CL $430 ha 
(20%) 
n.a STM profitable 
Barros and 
Uhl, 1995 
Brazil CL 14-26% n.a Authors argue 
STM is possible 
Boscolo & 
Mendelsohn 
1998 
Malaysia RIL vs CL $4400 ha CL 
$2660 ha STM 
1.66 STM Assumes 
RIL and >60 
cm dbh 
Browder et 
al., 1996 
Brazil New 
planting on 
degraded 
fallow; agro-
forestry;  
mahogany 
NPV = $226 ha 
degraded fallow; 
$-50 ha; agro-
forestry; $721 ha 
pure stand 
plantation 
 Not strictly 
comparable to 
other studies as 
new planting 
Bruenig (n.d) Malaysia CL vs STM  CL>STM Quoted in FAO, 
1999 
Dixon et al., 
1994 
Chile CL vs SFM $500-3000 per ha 
more than SFM 
  
FAO, 1997 Brazil RIL vs CL  CL>STM? Not quantified 
Hardner and 
Rice, 1994 
Brazil STM vs CL  CL > STM  
Howard and 
Valerio, 1996 
Costa Rica STM vs 
conversion 
STM in South 
$1340-1612 per 
ha; in North 
$671-1142 per ha  
(10%) 
STM > 
ranching but 
possibly not 
with crops  
Strong 
sensitivity to 
parameters for 
crops 
Howard et 
al., 1996 
Bolivia STM vs CL CL $334-449 ha 
STM $204-263 
ha (10%) 
1.3 – 1.7  
Johns et al., 
1996 
Brazil RIL vs CL  0.75 needs to be 
checked 
Kishor and 
Constantino, 
1993 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
 
STM vs CL 
vs ranching  
Liquidation=$12
92 ha 
Ranching= $1319 
ha 
STM = $854 ha. 
(8%) 
1.50 Liquidation 
involves 60% 
cover removal 
Haltia and 
Keipi, 1997 
Costa Rica STM vs 
ranching 
Managed nat. 
forest $294 ha 
better than 
ranching 
 Reworks 
Kishor and 
Constantino 
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Table 2:     continued 
 
Kollert et al., 
1995 
Malaysia STM CL > STM  STM profitable 
Kumari, 1996 Malaysia STM vs CL CL = $860-1380 
ha 
STM = $322-
$944 ha 
1.5 – 1.7 
(taking ‘best’ 
STM and 
same damage 
levels) 
 
Laarman et 
al., 1995 
Philip-
pines 
Community 
forest, STM 
STM = $638 ha 
(12%) 
 STM profitable 
Mendoza and 
Ayemou, 
1992 
Ivory 
Coast 
STM vs CL STM + 
processing = 
$160 ha (10%), 
but CL >STM 
 Check 
Peters et al., 
1989 
Peru SFM $933 ha (5%) 3.0 Disputed study 
Pinedo-
Vasquez, et 
al., 1992 
Peru Community 
forest, CL 
254% return on 
annual 
investment 
 Check 
Richards et 
al., 1991 
Mexico Community 
forest, STM 
14-15% annual 
return on capital,  
including 
processing 
  
Shawahid et 
al., 1997 
Malaysia Protection vs 
RIL 
Protection = 10.4 
mR, RIL = 26.6 
mR (DR=?) 
n.a Protection less 
desirable than 
RIL 
Southgate 
and Elgegren, 
1995 
Peru STM Negative NPV  Adverse public 
policy and 
guerrila 
warfare. NPV 
could have 
exceeded 
opp.cost of 
STM 
Stone, 1996 Brazil Unregulated 
CL 
8% profit margin 
for small mills, 
18% for large 
mills 
 Revisits 
Verissimo et 
al., 1992 
Uhl et al., 
1991 
Brazil Selective cut 
followed by 
conversion 
 C100% 
annual return 
 
Verissimo et 
al., 1995 
Brazil Unregulated 
single 
selective cut, 
but with 
regeneration 
28% annual 
profit including 
processing 
 Mahogany 
‘mining’: few 
trees left 
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Table 2:     continued 
 
Verissimo et 
al., 1992 
Brazil 
 
STM vs CL STM has 25% 
annual return on 
investment 
including 
processing 
26 (10%) 
19 (5%) 
 
World Bank 
(summarised 
in Grut, 
1990) 
Ghana 
 
 
 
Guinea 
RIL 
 
 
 
SFM 
25% IRR at 
border prices 
 
 
34% IRR at 
border prices 
 Use of border 
prices indicates 
an economic 
analysis rather 
than a financial 
analysis 
 
Sources and notes: 
Two literature overviews form the core of the table (Gullison et al., 1998, and FAO, 1999), but 
some entries have been modified and a number of additional studies have been added. IRR = 
internal rate of return. NPV = net present value. Where available, discount rates used in the 
studies are shown in brackets. ‘>’ means ‘more profitable than’. 
 
Those few studies that compare STM/SFM and CL therefore tend to be based on 
financial model simulations. Additionally, where there is additional evidence on 
the rate of return to STM/SFM, the relevant studies often do not attempt a 
comparison with CL, contenting themselves with a demonstration that STM/SFM 
is profitable per se. Some of the analyses are also not very clear on precisely what 
the forest ‘management’ regime is. 
 
While the quality of the analysis in some of the studies leaves something to be 
desired, the general conclusions emerging from Table 2 are the following: (a) that 
STM is potentially profitable at ‘reasonable’ discount rates of, say 5-10% (in real 
terms) - it is possible that financial viability would be doubtful at higher rates; and 
(b) that STM is almost systematically less profitable than ‘liquidation’ forestry 
and other forms of conventional logging. These conclusions echo those already 
reached by other commentators, e.g. Bach and Gram (1996). 
 
Nonetheless, while this inequality of profitability explains the widespread 
preference of loggers for CL, it does not justify it. The reason for this, as indicated 
previously, is that the financial cost benefit calculation of the logger is not the 
same as that for society generally and certainly not for the world as a whole.  
 
7.2 Factors that could favour the financial profitability of  STM 
Advocates of STM have drawn attention to four main factors that might increase 
the financial return to STM relative to CL: discount rates, future price increases, 
incremental growth rates for timber volume, and property rights.  
 
 27 
The discount rate 
One ‘price’ of potential importance for the SFM vs CL debate is the discount rate. 
For the financial perspective the relevant discount rate is that of the logger or 
concessionaire. For the national perspective, the relevant rate is the social discount 
rate. The two rates can be expected to differ, with the social rate being below the 
private rate (Pearce, 1986). Surprisingly little is known about discount rates in 
developing countries. Some evidence exists on discount rates for agriculturists in 
developing countries. For example, Cuesta et al., (1994) found that real personal 
discount rates of farmers in Costa Rica were in the range of 15-22%, and they use 
the finding to cast doubt on the economic feasibility of introducing soil 
conservation measures. Aylward and Porras (1998) suggest that a social discount 
rate for Costa Rica generally would be 7-10%, i.e. half the private rate. None-
theless, the range for the social rate is roughly in accord with the rates that have 
been used in forest studies in Costa Rica. By far the most comprehensive analysis 
is by Poulos and Whittington (1999) which covers the general public in Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Indonesia ,Bulgaria and Ukraine. While not all of these are 
countries with significant forest, they are typical of the range of forested countries. 
Poulos and Whittington find that short-term personal discount rates are 45-206% 
and longer term rates are11-28%. The long term rates are very consistent with the 
Cuesta, et al., (1994) study in Costa Rica. Rates this high would make it difficult 
to justify even the most conventional of development projects. In the context of 
forestry they are effectively fatal for any investment with a long-term focus. 
 
The importance of the discount rate can be illustrated by Figure 3. There a hypo-
thetical flow of profits from CL and SFM is illustrated with the typical ‘hump’ of 
returns under CL occurring early on. Annex 1 shows how the ‘switching’ discount 
rate can be found, i.e. the rate which would make the NPV of the two profit 
streams the same3.  While high personal discount rates appear to be the norm on 
the basis of the empirical evidence, it is important to stress that few studies exist 
that adopt rigorous methodologies for estimating those discount rates. Addition-
ally, some poor communities do manage timber production on a non-exploitative 
basis, suggesting that communal discount rates may be markedly less than purely 
personal rates (see Pinedo-Vazquez and Rabelo, 1999, on varzea logging). 
 
 
                                                 
3 Figure 3 assumes a constant discount rate over time. In practice, discount rates may vary with 
time due to changes in personal circumstances. 
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Figure 3: Typical pattern of profit flows from CL and STM 
 
 
Profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timber prices 
If timber prices are expected to appreciate then there is some benefit to curtailing 
cuts now in favour of the future (effectively, price increases can be thought of as a 
deduction from the discount rate). But future timber prices are unlikely to grow 
rapidly. Some of the high price increases simulated in the STM studies, e.g. 
Howard and Valerio (1996), are based on protected forest industries. World prices 
are a better guide. Moreover, world price (‘border prices’) would be the relevant 
magnitude in economic, as opposed to financial, studies. Rice et al., (1998) use 
2% p.a. growth in real prices which may, however, be an exaggeration of future 
price increases. Work at Resources for the Future (Sohngen et al.,1997)  suggests 
baseline price growth rates well under 1% p.a. for the next 100 years. Even with a 
high demand scenario, price increases barely exceed 1% per annum over the next 
60 years. These results are consistent with other estimates of long term trends – 
e.g. see Brooks et al., (1996). Overall, it seems unlikely that future price increases 
will confer significant advantages on STM relative to CL. More generally, as long 
as timber is ‘abundant’, stumpage prices will be low, making STM financially 
vulnerable (Southgate, 1998).  
 
Timber volume growth rates 
Timber volume growth rates have an effect similar to real relative price increases. 
If growth rates are faster under STM then the difference can be regarded as the 
CL cash 
flow 
STM cash 
flow 
Time 
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equivalent of a reduction in the discount rate. Rice et al., (1998) suggest 2% p.a. 
as an average for growth relevant to STM, i.e. 2% per annum in volume of the 
stand. However, quotations of percentage growth rates are not very meaningful. 
First, growth depends on stand condition such that growth is an inverse ‘U’ 
shaped curve relative to stand condition (low at poor states and low again if there 
is high density and crowding, although the latter is rare in managed natural 
forests) – see Vanclay (1994). Second, large trees may have small percentage 
growth rates but substantial incremental yields in terms of cubic metres of wood. 
Third, account has to be taken of damage in CL to residual trees (10-40 cm dbh) 
that will form the next crop in polycyclic management operations. Surviving 
damaged trees grow slowly and will not contribute to the next commercial  crop 
due to stem defects. Most of the growth benefit from RIL and STM derives from 
higher stocking and fewer weed dominated areas, such as vine blankets.  
 
Overall, STM could easily result in volume increments of commercial species that 
are 2-4 times higher than after CL. 
 
Property rights 
It is widely argued that insecure or short-term property rights encourage CL, so 
that longer-term rights would encourage a switch to SFM, or at least STM. Rice et 
al. (1998) accept the argument in principle but argue that longer-term concessions 
would not alter the underlying financial costs and benefits, favouring CL. But 
tenure might also encourage better environmental choices of equipment and the 
training of staff, or at least enable better choices to be made. Boscolo and Vincent 
(1998) simulate the effects of longer-term concessions on the timing of harvests in 
Malaysia and show that, on their model, it would make no difference. Generally, it 
does not pay to leave trees standing4. Probably the best way to accommodate the 
concession length issue is to regard longer concessions as an enabling device for 
STM which, without additional incentives such as performance bonds, will 
nonetheless be unlikely to lead to STM.  
 
Efficiency and best practice 
One remaining issue concerns the extent to which the STM systems observed in 
Table 1 reflect ‘best practice’. That is, what is being observed may not be the most 
efficient form of STM, making cost comparisons misleading. Various in-
efficiencies need to be addressed: (a) ratio of usable wood to cut wood; (b) ratio of 
                                                 
4 The issue of concession length needs to be distinguished from the issue of allocating rents 
where rent equals the difference between delivered log price and marginal cost, or, more 
correctly, the difference between price and marginal social cost. It has often been argued that 
rents should be taxed more heavily to discourage rent-seeking by loggers. But this is an issue of 
desirable distribution of rents, not of efficiency. Efficient solutions are not affected by the 
division of the rents between stakeholders. See Hyde and Sedjo (1992), Vincent (1993) and 
Hyde and Sedjo (1993). 
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cut wood to wood at the mill gate, (c) ratio of mill output to mill input. Do (a) and 
(b) vary by type of management regime? How do loggers respond to efficiency 
improvements (and why don’t they adopt them automatically?). Part of the 
problem seems to be that critics are damning STM as it has been practiced. 
Defenders of STM and SFM are saying that past systems were poorly 
implemented, e.g. by excessive canopy opening, inappropriate log transport, 
inappropriate machinery, lack of training and planning, etc. In other words, we 
need to know what would constitute an efficient system.  
 
But what constitutes efficient STM or SFM may be rather like the Holy Grail, 
since efficiency implies an agreed objective and the reality is that no such 
consensus exists. Objectives might, for example, embrace recreating the original 
stand, regenerating harvested species, conserving ‘habitat’ trees, minimising gaps, 
and so on. The reality seems to be that SFM is itself  an ‘elastic’ concept, making 
the criticism that it has not been practiced when it should have been, difficult to 
evaluate. 
 
Valorising non-commercial timber species 
It has been argued that ‘valorising’ non-commercial timber stock will provide less 
incentive to use regimes that damage residual stands (Buschbacher, 1990). Rice et 
al (1998) argue, on the other hand, that expanding the commercial range of 
species simply results in all species being exploited. The reality is complex and 
depends on prices for such species, supervision and what the management regime 
is trying to achieve. In Queensland, the valorisation of species took pressure off 
the best and most accessible areas, and good supervision of the operations meant 
that the additional species harvested did not result in degradation of the residual 
stand (Vanclay, 1996). But it is hard to generalise on the valorisation issue. 
 
7.2.7 Concessionaires and confidence 
Sustainable forest practices involve having confidence in the long term future. 
Many of the world’s most valuable forests are in areas where there is a potential 
for rapid political change and the insecurity that it engenders. The effect of lack of 
security will be to reduce confidence in the future and hence to favour short-run 
exploitation. The effect is the same as that of a high discount rate. 
 
 
8. The National Perspective 
 
The national perspective on land use options differs from the financial analysis 
outlined above in several ways. First, logging may not be the ‘best’ use of the 
forest land, so that the options on land use broaden to those set out in Figure 1. 
Second, attention now has to be paid to the sequencing of land use. Figure 1 
suggests one possibility is that logging is followed be either protection or 
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conversion (and to which we might add abandonment). Which one follows will 
determine the flow of costs and benefits to the nation. 
 
Third, financial gains and losses should no longer be as relevant as economic 
gains and losses, i.e. financial flows should be shadow priced. Fourth, all forest 
values other than timber values become relevant. 
 
We address each modification in turn. 
 
8.1 Widening the options to all forest land uses 
Figure 2 shows a set of alternative forest land uses. In practice there will be 
combinations of uses that should also be considered, e.g. agro-forestry, clearance 
for plantation forestry, oil palm, etc. But the principle is the same, whereas a 
private logger might reasonably consider only the financial costs and benefits of 
logging options, the nation state should consider all options and evaluate their 
economic value. 
 
8.2 Sequencing of land use 
Surprisingly little attention appears to be paid in the CL ‘vs’ SFM debate to the 
sequencing issue. It is well known that logging opens up frontier land which may 
then be colonised by agriculturists5. Repetto (1990) is of the view that most 
deforestation arises from the initial action of logging which creates access to 
hitherto inaccessible forest land. In their review of econometric studies of 
deforestation Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) find that deforestation is higher 
when land is accessible, when timber and agricultural prices are high (encouraging 
logging and conversion), when rural wages are low and when there are 
opportunities for long distance trade. Of these factors, several – accessibility, 
timber prices, and trade potential – all relate to logging. Southgate (1998) 
documents cases where most road construction in forested areas has come from 
loggers, encouraging conversion to cropland and pasture. Low stumpage prices 
might contribute to conversion since even the modest rates of return that might be 
expected from agriculture compare favourably to forestry at low stumpage prices.  
 
This picture contrasts with the one suggested by some analysts who argue that CL 
could be followed by outright protection (Rice et al., 1998a; Rice et al 1998b; 
Cannon et al., 1998). The argument here is as follows: loggers are unlikely to 
return to the same area after the initial logging phase because (a) they do not 
practice sustainable forestry, thus making future timber stands unlikely to be of 
commercial interest, and (b) because they have high discount rates, also making 
                                                 
5  Sequencing may happen the other way round. The land may initially be cleared for agriculture 
and taking timber may be an ancillary operation aimed at helping recover the costs of 
conversion.  
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future yields unattractive. The land is therefore potentially available for protection 
without the further threat of logging. The argument has some force, but there are 
several problems. 
 
First, the picture of loggers entering an area only once is often not accurate. 
Loggers often return 5-10 years after the first harvest to harvest trees that have 
become commercially valuable because of changes in transport infrastructure, in 
milling methods and market potential.  The later phase, re-entry loggers may also 
be different people to the first-time entrant: smaller operators with lower operating 
costs acting as agents for small mills working in formerly high graded areas. The 
‘protect after logging‘ scenario thus has to relate to a context in which the threat of 
subsequent logging interventions remains. 
 
Second, even if the threat of further logging is removed, the threat of colonisation 
for non-timber purposes is not removed and, indeed, is, ex hypothesi, more likely. 
Colonisation here may be for subsistence agriculture but also for far more 
attractive agro-industrial use such as oil palm. Additionally , the ‘logging followed 
by protection’ view is based on what could happen rather than on what actually 
has happened in the past. However, there is an argument that says protection is 
easier after CL because land prices fall once loggers withdraw. Land can then be 
bought cheaply for protection purposes.  
 
Third, CL may result in such significant degradation that what is left is not worth 
protecting.  Substantial opening of canopies results in increased susceptibility to 
fires and  increases in the likelihood of weed infestations. A spiral of degradation 
soon becomes irreversible. 
 
Conventional logging followed by protection has indeed occurred, for example in 
Queensland, in the Noel Kemp Mercado carbon offset project in Bolivia, and in 
parts of Africa. But how far these examples arise simply because there were funds 
available for subsequent protection and because there was low population pressure 
on available land is unclear. Indeed, it is hard to envisage many circumstances in 
which there will be limited pressures to convert the land. The choice is then not 
often between ‘logging followed by protection’ and SFM/STM, but between some 
form of continuous forestry and land conversion. The potential for logging  to be 
followed by protection may therefore be smaller than some of the literature 
acknowledges, although Reid and Rice (1997) accept that STM will be best suited 
to areas where there are strong pressures to colonise the forest for conversion. 
And, of course, protection is costly and in no way avoids the need for continued 
management. 
 
One other form of sequencing has strong arguments in its favour. Here the aim 
would be to meet timber demand from plantations, leaving natural forests to be 
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managed mostly for non-timber purposes.  The sequence is then to afforest rapidly 
to establish plantations on degraded lands, accepting some loss of natural forest in 
the interim, then declaring the remaining natural forest to be protected whilst 
meeting demand for timber from plantations. Hunter (1998) describes this 
situation for New Zealand. That such a policy works for New Zealand, and has 
been suggested in the USA where some environmental groups are calling for 
cessation of all logging on in National Forests,  carries the suggestion that this 
option is best for countries with relatively high levels of per capita income. A 
country like Malaysia, where there are already extensive lowland plantations, 
could adopt such a policy, but lower income countries are still likely to face 
formidable pressures for conversion of natural forest, so that finding profitable 
forest management systems is still important6. 
 
Again, it needs to be recalled that protection is not costless. Not only are there 
continuing management costs, but there are capital costs of fencing and 
management institutions. To these must be added the value of the protected land 
in its forgone use(s).  
 
8.3 Shadow pricing private costs and benefits 
The analyses of costs and benefits to loggers have typically all been in terms of 
financial rather than economic flows. Exceptions, noted in Table 2, are the World 
Bank studies reported by Grut (1990).  
 
8.4 Allowing for non-timber values 
Allowing for non-timber values of  the forest alters the focus of analysis from 
STM to SFM. In economic language, the relevance measure is now total 
economic value (TEV) from the different possible land uses. TEV comprises use 
and non-use values and both are capable of expression in monetary terms by 
estimating the relevant willingness to pay (WTP) for those functions (Pearce, 
1993, 1996).7 The basic argument is that, even if STM is ‘worse’ than CL in 
financial terms, if the WTP for the incremental non-timber benefits of  SFM 
exceeds the financial deficit, SFM will be preferred from a national perspective. 
More formally,  
                                                 
6 The New Zealand and Malaysia examples raise the interesting issue of whether there might be 
an ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC) for forest protection. EKCs exist when growth in 
income per capita first results in environmental degradation and then, after some turning point, a 
reduction in degradation. Such curves have been found for air pollution. In the current case, the 
hypothesis would be that countries opt for more forest protection and more plantations as 
incomes pass a certain point. 
7 It is important to understand that all ‘prices’ in economics reflect willingness to pay. Some 
commentators limit WTP to expressions of WTP derived from questionnaire surveys. This is not 
correct. All market prices, for example, reflect the WTP of consumers for the product in 
question. 
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SFM > CL, if  WTPntv > Πcl - Πstm  ….[1] 
 
Where ‘ntv’ is non-timber values and Π is profit. 
 
Bawa and Seidel (1998) say there is no experience of timber regimes that integrate 
NTPs into the management system, but this does not square with Putz (1992), or 
with empirical experience from Costa Rica (Romero, 1999) and Nicaragua 
(Salick, 1995). Romero (1999) found that RIL had no effect on the available 
biomass of epiphytic bryophyes that are harvested and sold by local people. 
Similarly, Salick (1995) found that NTFPs and natural forest management for 
timber were compatible in Nicaragua.  In small scale natural forests integration of 
NTFPs with timber is more the rule than the exception (see Pinedo-Vazquez and 
Rabelo, 1998).  However,  Putz et al., (1999) note that management invariably 
involves favouring some wildlife species over others. 
 
The evidence on environmental impacts of logging regimes 
The presumption in inequality [1] above is that environmental benefits under 
STM/SFM exceed those under CL. This has been challenged by Rice et al (1997, 
1998a, 1998b). They argue that the physical effects of CL on the forest were 
relatively mild for the case they studied in lowland Bolivia. However, that case 
relates to extremely low intensity mahogany harvesting, and it would be hard to 
envisage that it would also hold for the much more intensive harvesting character-
istic of the eastern Amazon, or the dipterocarp forest of southeast Asia. Rice et al., 
(1998) and Reid and Rice (1997) argue that STM/SFM can be just as destructive 
of the total forest as CL, a view supported by Bawa and Seidler (1998). Un-
controlled logging, it is argued, may be comparatively benign, especially on flat 
lands that are logged when soils are dry and where there is a low density of 
commercially exploitable species. Without the prior topographical, soil traffic-
ability and density conditions, however, CL may be very destructive. STM can be 
destructive if it involves major canopy clearance in an effort to encourage 
regeneration of light demanding species, but much depends here on the manage-
ment system in place (see below).  
 
Extrapolation from single site studies, however, is dangerous.  Manokaran (1998) 
describes the effects of selective logging in Pasoh, Malaysia. Contrary to state-
ments that no selective logging system has been successful (Rice et al., 1998), 
Manakoran finds that the Malayan Uniform System (MUS) of selective cutting in 
the 1950s successfully regenerated the basal area of primary forest which, by the 
mid 1990s, was well stocked with commercially valuable dipterocarp species. He 
contrasts this with the far less successful selective management systems (SMS) 
being practised in the hill forests.  Moreover, the Queensland experience of over 
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one hundred years of logging and close to SFM also suggests that selective 
logging can be successful (Vanclay, 1994, 1996). 
 
Biodiversity 
Part of the problem with the discussion on environmental impacts concerns the 
characterisation of the environmental objectives of forest management. Whereas 
Rice et al., (1997) talk primarily in terms of the maintenance of biodiversity, 
others would argue that what matters is the maintenance of ecosystem functions 
and ecological processes. Some of the concern about avoiding management-
induced changes in tropical forest composition is based on the concept of ‘climax 
communities’, and the idea that tropical forests are unchanging and lacking in 
resilience. Given the long history of substantial human impacts on tropical forests 
and the large areas of tropical forest currently under some sort of silvicultural 
management by people, the incompatibility of management for timber with bio-
diversity maintenance seems largely unfounded. For example, many researchers 
have reported that stands with mahogany almost certainly suffered severe natural 
disturbances in the past, or regenerated in agricultural clearings that were 
abandoned centuries ago. Despite this evidence for ecological resilience, much 
more research is needed on how to mitigate the deleterious impacts of forest 
management operations. For example, how should untreated reserves be 
distributed within managed forests, and is it preferable, from a biodiversity main-
tenance perspective, to concentrate or disperse logging operations?  
 
But even at the level of biodiversity the issue is far from clear cut.  First, all forest 
management is likely to reduce biodiversity relative to pre-intervention 
conditions, or at least to change species composition. The very term ’manage-
ment’ means that something is being done to the forest that would not have 
happened without intervention. Second, the issue then becomes one of comparing 
the biodiversity profile – i.e. the nature and extent of diversity - under the different 
management regimes, say SFM and CL. Thus, Rice et al., (1998b) make a 
biodiversity conservation argument in favour of introducing protection after 
logging has taken place. They suggest that even CL followed by protection is 
superior to STM/SFM because the former halts the process of forest domestication 
But this is a double edged argument, for CL could just as easily result in the loss 
of species dependent on large canopy openings or for regeneration pioneer 
species.  Certainly, CL stands are especially prone to weed infestations due to 
excessive damage and lack of pre- or post-logging treatments to discourage weeds 
and encourage potential crop trees. Even though it does not constitute STM or 
SFM, reduced impact logging (RIL) would be a substantial step in the right 
direction. Thus, pre-felling vine cutting can substantially reduce post-logging 
incidence of serious vine infestations, and also reduce logging damage where 
vines tie together tree crowns. RIL thus constitutes a major step forward.  
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Additionally, there has been a tendency to generalise from single area case 
studies. The work of Rice et al., relies heavily on observations in the dry forests of 
Northern Bolivia where, if sustainable timber exploitation for the species currently 
harvested is to be practiced, substantial canopy manipulation is required in order 
to provide the conditions for the regeneration of light-demanding species, 
especially Swietenia macrophylla. The structure and composition of the forest 
would thus have to change in a substantial way to avoid loss of the currently most 
valuable species of canopy trees. Even for these forests, it is unclear that species 
loss due to management need be significant. These forests have survived major 
disturbances in the past, and proper zoning of the forest should ensure biodiversity 
is retained.  
 
Not all commercially valuable timber tree species require substantial canopy 
disturbance for regeneration. In southeast Asia dipterocarp forests, for example, 
minimising damage to residual stands is important to protect the abundant 
advanced regeneration of commercial species present before harvesting and to 
reduce the likelihood of  vine infestation once the canopy is opened. The valuable 
canopy dominants in the forests of much of the Guyana Shield area in northern 
South America are also negatively affected by the substantial canopy openings 
required to regenerate mahogany in northern Bolivia. 
 
Thus, it is not possible to say that STM systems necessarily result in less 
biodiversity than CL systems. Without careful management, they may do so. If 
one of the aims is to conserve biodiversity then management systems should be 
capable of achieving that aim.  In doing so, it may well be the case that the 
financial returns to STM fall since there will often be a trade-off between 
biodiversity objectives and maximum financial return. Given that biodiversity 
conservation figures prominently in Forest Stewardship Council certification, any 
price or marketing gains from certification will also reduce the profit differential 
between CL and SFM. 
 
An interesting study by Stephens (1999) in South Australian Eucalyptus regnans 
forests shows that conservation strategies for Leadbeater’s possum are best 
effected through forest reserves, with a close running second best approach being 
modified harvesting regimes, and with both strategies being preferred over longer 
rotations. ‘Best’ and ‘better’ in this context are measured by the survival prob-
ability of Leadbeater’s possum (the ‘effectiveness’ of the strategy) and the forgone 
timber values (the cost). The modified harvesting regimes involved the retention 
of small habitat patches within harvested areas, suggesting, again, that careful 
logging is consistent with biodiversity protection.  
 
Carbon  
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Forest-based carbon sequestration, both by conserving carbon already stored in 
forests and  by sequestering additional carbon by stimulating tree growth, has 
become an important focus for foresters because of the role that forest carbon 
release plays in accelerating global warming. This role was given official 
recognition in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Countries can benefit in terms of achieving their emission 
reduction targets by engaging in ‘carbon trades’ whereby they offset some of their 
own emission targets by reducing net emissions in another country. The issue here 
is how different management regimes affect carbon storage.  
 
Silvicultural practices affect carbon balances. Thus, if vines are cut and left to 
decompose, carbon is released in the short term from the decomposition process, 
but can be offset later by the faster growth of the trees that are now free of the 
vines. SFM, practised properly, involves minimum site preparation and extended 
rotations, whereas clear cutting results in loss of necromass and soil organic 
matter which may well not be offset by subsequent sequestration through faster 
tree growth. In general, then, silvicultural practice benefits the carbon balance. 
Exceptions might include savannah woodlands (e.g. the pine forests of Central 
America) that are invaded by shade tolerant and less fire resistant trees. Restoring 
the open stands will result in carbon releases that may not be compensated for by 
increasing sequestration in the remaining trees. 
 
Dixon (1997) conducts a survey of experience with silvicultural practices in forty 
countries. Dixon’s results are shown in Table 3. The analysis suggests that silvi-
cultural practices can result in additional sequestration or conservation of carbon 
ranging from 5tC to 41tC depending on latitude.  Dixon suggests that if these 
practices were applied to the 600 million ha of land suitable  for forest 
management in the nations surveyed, conservation of carbon would be of the 
order of  100-300 mtC p.a. over a 50 year period8. The economic efficiency of 
such measures is unlikely to compare favourably to the costs of reducing green-
house gas emissions through energy-related schemes, or from plantations, but 
Dixon suggests that the practices in question could sequester carbon at some $13 
tC.  This is lower than the $20-30 tonne often quoted.  
 
 
                                                 
8 For reference, global emissions of CO2 are some 6.2 billion tC, so that the potential from 
improved silvicultural practice amounts to 1.6% to 4.8% of world emissions. 
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Table 3: Dixon’s survey estimates of incremental carbon sequestration 
from silvicultural practices 
 
Latitude Practice TCha
-1
p.a 
High 60-90
o Fertilisation 
Thinning 
Weeding 
Drainage 
Median value 
1-16 
3-  7 
1-  3 
3-11 
5 
Mid  30-60
o Fertilisation 
Thinning 
Weeding 
Median value 
2-  28 
15-65 
8-  34 
22 
Low   0-30o Fertilisation 
Thinning 
Median value 
26-71 
18-64 
41 
Source:  Dixon (1997). 
 
 
In comparative simulations of carbon sequestration in Malaysian forests logged by 
trained crews following RIL guidelines and with CNV methods, Pinard and Putz 
(1996) (see also Boscolo and Vincent, 1998, which adopts the Pinard-Putz 
estimates) showed that the use of RIL techniques conserved carbon in the 
harvested stands and resulted in substantially greater rates of post-harvesting 
sequestration due to higher stocking of potential crop trees and fewer problems 
with vines and other weeds.  
 
An interesting study by Solberg (1997) suggests that if carbon is valued at $50 tC, 
approximately the level of the Norwegian carbon tax, the value of Norwegian 
forests would increase by 2-30 times the value of timber output. If forests are 
managed according to their mixed timber and carbon value, as opposed to their 
timber value alone, significant changes would need to occur in management 
practices. Standing volumes and rotation ages would need to be increased, and 
there would need to be substantial increases in investment in silviculture.  Leakage 
issues would loom large under such a scenario, given the large and growing 
international demand for paper and other wood fibre products. With long 
rotations, natural forest succession would occur which, in some cases, would 
reduce the attractiveness of forests for early successional species of plants and 
animals, as well as for recreation, so some of the ‘carbon gains’ would be offset 
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by other factors. Despite these misgivings, the clear implication is that the 
attachment of economic values to carbon via trading and/or meeting domestic 
emission reduction targets could substantially favour better managed forests9.  
 
Numerous ‘carbon offset’ projects exist either in actual or simulated form 
(simulations often involve actual projects which are not primarily designed to 
reduce carbon emissions, but which are being ‘tracked’ to see if the carbon 
benefits would make a significant difference; other simulations exist that are not 
associated with particular projects). Details of the various deals and their costs per 
tonne of carbon reduced can be found in Pearce et al., (1998). Few of the deals 
relate to forest management. The offset projects can be analysed to elicit the 
average costs per tonne of carbon equivalent reduced. However, since the deals 
have not generally been developed on a cost efficient basis (selecting the cheapest 
options first) such an analysis is not particularly helpful. Estimates of the prices at 
which carbon will trade under the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ in the Kyoto Protocol 
do, however, suggest that around $10 tC is likely to be a mean price, provided 
substantial trading takes place. As the USA is committed to meeting some three-
quarters of its Kyoto target by trading (US Administration, 1998), and the 
European Union has recently announced that it may permit up to 50% of its own 
target to met from trading, the market could be substantial. A suggested guideline 
is that carbon may trade at between $5 and $15 tC. The importance of these 
figures can readily be seen. For forest conservation as a whole, compared to 
conversion, forests may secure a carbon ‘credit’ of $75o to $2250 per hectare on 
this basis10. For the comparison between SFM and CL, of course, the gains would 
be far more modest. If Dixon’s figures (Dixon, 1997) are adopted, incremental 
gains over CL may range from 5-41tC, or  $25 to $615 ha. 
 
However, great care needs to be taken in multiplying carbon storage or 
sequestration estimates by unit money values for  traded carbon. The procedure is 
correct if the price of traded carbon is an equilibrium price, i.e. one that equates 
supply and demand for traded carbon. That price will be sensitive to the number 
of deals done. If there are vast ‘offers’ of carbon from countries seeking to 
capitalise on the carbon value of sustainable forestry, it may have the effect of 
forcing the price of carbon down, thus reducing the economic returns from carbon 
conservation. These ‘system wide’ effects have been stressed in a number of 
studies, e.g. Sohngen et al., (1998). 
 
Willingness to pay for certified timber 
There are two approaches to securing an economic measure of the value of non-
timber forest values. The first rests on what people are willing to pay for timber 
                                                 
9 But for a sceptical view see Smith et al. (1999b). 
10 Assuming 50tC to 150tC is emitted by conversion. See Annex 3. 
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certified as coming from ‘sustainable’ forests, the idea being that ‘sustainable’ 
timber embodies all non-timber values in some premium over the world price for 
timber. The second attempts directly to estimate the economic value of the various 
forests functions independently.  
 
If consumers of wood products are willing to pay a premium to guarantee that the 
forests supplying the products are sustainably managed, then that willingness to 
pay can be thought of as an approximation of the WTP in equation [1] above.  
Similarly, if forest companies are willing to adopt sustainable practices in order to 
secure some marketing gain from certification, then the costs of certification 
provide a lower bound of the additional value of certification.  
 
Certification schemes exist to guarantee the sustainability of various forests, akin 
to ‘eco-labelling’ of various products. Various certifying bodies are accredited by 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and 3.5 m cubic metres of certified timber 
entered international trade in 1996, whilst 10 million ha of forests has been 
certified by 1998 (Crossley and Points, 1998). Certification costs are around $0.2 
to 1.7 per ha for developing countries (Crossley and Points, 1998) and 9-12 cents 
per acre for assessment and 1-3 cents per acre per annum for licensing and 
auditing  in the USA (Mater et al., 1999). Accordingly, any WTP above this level 
of cost represents the ‘net premium’ for SFM.  
 
The evidence on the premium consumers are WTP for certified timber is mixed. A 
survey of four studies in Barbier et al., (1994) revealed the following: 
 
(1) a survey of  UK manufacturers in 1990 suggested 65% were WTP more for 
certified timber; 
(2) a survey of UK consumers in 1991 suggested a 13-14% premium WTP 
(3) a survey of UK consumers in 1992 indicated that 58% would not buy  
timber if they knew it came from rainforests, and 
(4) a 1992 survey of timber importers suggested that 70% thought their 
customers were not willing to pay for certified timber. 
 
An additional survey in British Columbia  suggests that 67% of respondents to a 
survey would pay 5% more for certified timber, and 13% said they would pay 
10% more (Forsyth et al, 1999). 
 
Crossley and Points (1998) suggest that certified products are securing premia of 
5-15% in some cases, but that the real benefits of certification for industry lie in 
securing greater market share and longer term contracts. There is some evidence 
that companies gaining certification secure higher company value, i.e. the value of 
certification shows up in share prices on the stock exchanges. 
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If we take the 5-15% range as a likely measure of premium, the argument in 
Gullison (1995) and Rice et al (1997) is that this is far from sufficient to 
compensate for the additional profitability of CL over SFM as shown in Table 2. 
But their argument is suspect. Table 2 suggests that a typical ratio of financial 
profits for CL relative to STM would be, say, 1.5. For STM to become 
competitive it is not necessary for prices to rise by 50%. A hypothetical numerical 
example should suffice to show that the price premium need only be a fraction of 
the difference in profits between CL and STM. If costs of CL are 75 and those for 
STM are 100, but both face the same market price of 150, then the ratio is 75/50 = 
1.5, similar to that found in Table 2. The net price premium that will make profits 
equal is given by  
 
p* = (CST-CCL)/P 
 
where P is the common log price. In the numerical example, p* = 17% (25/150), 
which is considerably different to 50%. It is true that this premium is gross of 
certification costs, so that the true price premium required for parity between 
profits in the two regimes is higher than 17%.  
 
Willingness to pay for non-timber products and services 
A more direct approach is to seek the willingness to pay people express for the 
particular non-timber products and services from forests. We review what is 
known about these WTPs. But note that they need to be applied to the differential 
flow of  environmental products and services from SFM as opposed to forests that 
are just logged. The total values would be relevant if all such services were lost, as 
they might be from forest conversion. The differential values are relevant for the 
CL/SFM comparison. The importance of this distinction is that we know a 
reasonable amount about the economic value of forest services, but, apparently, 
little about the differential flows of those services according to different forest 
management regimes. 
 
Environmental economists have made great progress in eliciting economic values 
for forest products and services. Recent surveys include: Godoy et al., (1993), 
Pearce and Moran (1994), Gregersen et al., (1995), Lampietti and Dixon (1995),  
Southgate (1996), Chomitz and Kumari (1996), Pearce (1998), and Pearce et al 
(1999).  The Gregersen et al., study is not comprehensive and tends to exaggerate 
the problems of applying valuation techniques, whilst some of the others are 
already dated11.  
 
                                                 
11 IFF(1999) also reviews valuation in the context of forests but the review is rather limited in 
scope. 
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There are of course substantial difficulties in reaching general conclusions from 
WTP studies, primarily because appropriate guidelines for carrying out such 
studies, such as those set out in Godoy et al., (1993) and Godoy and Lubowski 
(1992) have not been followed. The result has been a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate valuation procedures. The types of mistake made have included 
generalisation from studies of a small area of forest to wider areas, with little 
regard for (a) the fact that the area in question will not be typical of the whole 
forest area simply because of variations in distance to market, and (b) ignoring the 
fact that, in a hypothetical world where the whole forest was exploited for non-
timber products, the prices, and hence the profitability, of non-timber production 
would fall. Another methodological issue is the extent to which values are based 
on maximum sustainable yield or on actual harvests, which are often very much 
less, i.e. the values that emerge are sensitive to what is assumed about the 
management regime in place. Godoy et al., (1993) also point out that some studies 
value the stock and some the flow, the former being an interesting measure for 
wealth accounting but of little value when comparing competing land use values. 
Studies also vary as to whether they report gross revenues or revenues net of 
labour and other costs. Finally, little account has been taken in many of the studies 
of the extent to which the relevant non-timber activity is itself sustainable, so that 
what is being compared may well be two non-sustainable land use options.  
 
Annex 2 provides an overview of what is known about non-timber values based 
on WTP studies. Extracting some kind of consensus from the estimates in Annex 
2 is clearly hazardous. We can speculate on the following annual values but care 
needs to be taken in generalising any of these numbers (Southgate et al., 1996): 
 
Non-timber extractive Values:  $               50 ha 
Non-extractive: 
  recreation    $        5 -   10 ha 
  ecological    $                30 ha 
  carbon    $     600-4400 ha 
Non-Use     $          2 -  27 ha 
 
Whichever way the analysis is done, the major role of carbon values is revealed. 
Should, for some reason, global warming not remain a serious issue of concern, 
then tropical forests might be found to have measured environmental value of 
around $100 per hectare, far from enough to justify outright protection on 
economic grounds. 
 
Kumari’s study for Malaysia 
One of the few studies that attempts to place an economic value on the differential 
flows of  goods and services from CL and SFM is Kumari (1995, 1996) for the 
peat swamp forests of North Selangor in Malaysia. The analysis relates to the 
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differential benefits of moving from an existing unsustainable timber management 
system, based on Malaysian Stateland forest practice, to sustained forest manage-
ment overall. Various degrees of sustainability are addressed to allow for the 
trade-off between sustained timber and non-timber products and services. The 
results are shown below. 
 
NPV 1990 US$/ha at 8% discount rate 
 Unsustainable 
CL 
Sustainable 
option 1 
Sustainable 
option 2 
Sustainable 
option 3 
Timber values 1380 944 700 510 
Local/national 
non-timber values 
251 308 447 563 
Global values 3356 3645 3658 3668 
Total 4987 4897 4805 4741 
 
Notes: assumes 20% damage case. Kumari (1996) also estimates NPV for a 50% 
damage case. M.ringits converted to $ at 2.5 R per $. Option 3 is more sustainable 
than 2, 2 is more sustainable than 1. 
 
 
Assuming constant damage from logging across all management schemes, CL 
would be preferred to each of the sustainable options, although the uncertainty in 
the approaches used to value the impacts is such that the statistical significance of 
the differences shown above is unlikely to be high. However, Kumari (1996) 
argues that the damage rate will be much higher, at 50%, for the least benign 
forms of timber extraction, the first two columns above. In that case the total 
damages would change as follows: 
 
Total 4092 4252 4805 4741 
 
The sustainable systems are now markedly better than the unsustainable systems. 
The ‘best’ sustainable system shows a 13% improvement on the ‘best’ 
unsustainable system. 
 
The national non-timber benefits comprise rattan, bamboo, recreational and water 
benefits, together with ago-hydrological benefits because of the regulation of 
water supplies. The global benefits comprise endangered species and carbon, with 
the latter being the most important. The economic values shown reflect (a) the 
difference in unit ‘prices’ (WTP) applied to the impacts, and (b) the differences in 
ecological impacts. Taking the ‘best’ sustainable option (2) and comparing it to 
the base case of unsustainable management which maximises timber benefits 
alone, the incremental changes are as follows: 
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 Increase in NPV for Option 2 relative to 
unsustainable base case. NPV 1990 $US/ha 
Timber -160 
National non-timber +225 
Global +648 
Total +713 
 
Whereas timber benefits decline, as would be expected from the analysis in Table 
2 of this analysis which shows relative profitability of timber from different 
regimes , non-timber and global benefits increase more than enough to offset the 
losses. 
 
How typical this analysis is for forests generally is of course open to serious 
question. In this case, for example, the agro-hydrological benefits account for 
about two-thirds of the national non-timber incremental benefits, rattan accounting 
for the rest. The fairly dominant role of carbon is borne out by the review in 
Annex 2, even though Kumari uses different (and lower) carbon values. 
Additional questions arise with respect to the economic analysis itself since it uses 
several ‘benefits transfer’ estimates (essentially, borrowing WTP figures from 
other studies). It is known that benefits transfer is subject to significant margins of 
error. Most importantly, the global benefits will not accrue to forest owners or 
concessionaires without institutional change which compensates them for storing 
carbon in the biomass. Existing carbon trades, and those expected under the Kyoto 
Protocol, thus become extremely important. In essence, Kumari’s analysis 
provides the ‘demonstration’ phase, but not the capture phase of the analysis, as 
she herself notes. 
 
Nonetheless, Kumari’s approach, which is essentially traditional incremental cost-
benefit analysis, is the correct one and is likely to be the only one that can capture 
all the relevant changes in the multiple outputs of different forest management 
regimes. 
 
Bann’s study for Cambodia 
Bann (1997) reports detailed economic values for timber, non-timber products and 
environmental benefits for forest land in Ratanakiri, Cambodia. The analysis is 
interesting since it suggests that, for this case, NTFPs alone represent the best use 
of the forest land, although there is a crucial difference between actual, current 
rates of collection and those that could be obtained, the latter being based on a full 
forest inventory. The essential results are shown below (with corrections as there 
are several wrong totals in the original and environmental benefits are wrongly 
treated in the summary table). 
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NPV at 6% US$/ha 
 
Existing 
sustainable 
NTFP collection 
Potential 
sustainable 
NTPF collection 
Sustainable 
timber 
Unsustainable 
timber 
NTFPs: 
Malva nuts 
Rattan 
Bamboo 
697 3811 
23 
88 
0 0 
 
Environmental 
benefits: 
Biodiversity 
Watershed 
Carbon 
 
 
 
511 
76 
7 
 
 
 
511 
76 
7 
 
Assumed to be 
half NTPF 
scenarios = 297 
 
0 
 
Timber 
 
0 
 
0 
 
408 
 
1697 
 
Total 
 
1291 
 
4516 
 
705 
 
1697 
 
 
 
The columns show the net present value of each option. The first column of 
results shows the existing practice. The next column shows the social benefits if 
the existing practice was used to full potential. The final columns show sustain-
able and unsustainable timber regimes.  
  
Bann’s conclusion is that the inventory-based NTFP scenario, i.e. utilising NTFPs 
to the full, would maximise economic returns. Note, however, that if NTFPs are 
ignored, unsustainable timber is to be preferred even allowing for the higher 
environmental benefits of the sustainable timber option. The NPV arising from 
actual collection of NTFPs does not compare with CL either. Bann’s conclusions 
echo those of Peters et al (1989) for the Peruvian Amazon. However, that study 
has been severely criticised on methodological grounds (e.g. Godoy et al., 1993), 
and is also not consistent with later work on NTFP yields (Phillips, 1993).  
 
Shawahid et al., study for Malaysia 
While not a comprehensive study, Shahwahid et al., (1997) and Shahwahid et al., 
(1998) suggest the interesting finding that RIL forestry in Hulu (Ulu) Langat 
Forest Reserve, Selangor is preferable to outright protection. Total protection is 
assumed to have zero timber production, positive water yield benefits and 
sedimentation protection benefits for a nearby hydro-electric power station. 
Outright protection results in a NPV of 10.4 million ringits, whereas RIL results in 
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26.6 million ringits due to the gain in timber production and the limited impact on 
hydroelectric power. 
 
Mattsson’s study for Sweden 
Mattsson (1994) reports a partial economic valuation study of different timber 
regimes for northern Sweden. He compares clear cutting combined with artificial 
regeneration and natural regeneration using advance growth or seed trees. 
Contingent valuation was used for a sample of 800 people in the county where the 
forest is located. Respondents were asked their willingness to pay for different 
landsacpes without being told that the various depictions reflected different silvi-
cultural regimes. Depending on the mixtures of pine and broadleaves, the average 
willingness to pay for natural regeneration systems varied from about 700 SEK to 
3000 SEK per individual per year. Mattsson notes that his findings are consistent 
with general preference surveys in Sweden which find that people are opposed to 
clear felling. 
 
Yaron’s study for Cameroun 
Yaron (1999) and Groosman and Yaron (1999) investigate the potential for forest 
conservation in the Mount Cameroun area. The land use options considered are (a) 
oil palm and rubber plantations, (b) sustainable forest use and (c) subsistence-
oriented agriculture (‘chop farms’). Since only one type of forest management 
option is considered, the analysis does not shed much light on the issue of forest 
management choice. Nonetheless, it is significant that SFM is economically the 
preferable option in each of the five regions studies, as shown in Table 4. 
 
The major issue to note is that SFM is not economically profitably if ‘direct use 
values’ only are calculated, i.e. if consideration is given only to the marketed 
produce from the land. This holds even when non-timber products are included. 
The exception is area 5 where Prunus africana is grown in the forest option. 
Generally, then, non-marketed values are very important. Moreover, within the 
non-market values, carbon dominates, a result consistent with the review carried 
out by Pearce (1998).  
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Table 4: Net economic returns to SFM in Mt Cameroun area over and 
above next  best use of the land   
(NPV in UK£ per ha at 10% discount rate) 
 
 Area A Area B Area C Area D Area E 
Next best use Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm Chop farm 
Direct use 
value 
 
NTFPs 
 
Carbon 
 
Medicinal 
plants 
 
Flood 
prevention 
 
Preventing 
sedimentation 
 
NUV 
 
-884 
 
+8 
 
+971 
 
 
+1 
 
 
0 
 
 
+8 
 
+62 
 
-790 
 
+15 
 
+971 
 
 
+2 
 
 
+120 
 
 
+7 
 
+62 
 
-271 
 
+14 
 
+1090 
 
 
+2 
 
 
+136 
 
 
+11 
 
+62 
 
-521 
 
+14 
 
+864 
 
 
+2 
 
 
+168 
 
 
+3 
 
+62 
 
+1537 
 
+14 
 
+981 
 
 
+2 
 
 
0 
 
 
+65 
 
+62 
Total + 166 +387 +1046 + 591 +2661 
Source: Yaron (1999) 
Notes: NUV = non use value, see Annex 3. NTFP = non-timber forest products. 
Direct use value = revenues from timber, agriculture or oil palm. No study was 
conducted for the estimate of NUV and it should therefore be regarded as a guess 
only.  Note that each entry refers to the difference in net present value returns from 
SFM relative to the returns from subsistence agriculture. Thus, area A is worse 
than subsistence agriculture by UK£ 884 per ha for direct use, but £971 better for 
carbon. 
 
 
Smith et al., Study for Peru 
Smith et al., (1999a) (see also Mourato, 1999) conduct a contingent valuation 
study of slash-and-burn farmers in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon. 
They sought the farmers’ willingness to accept compensation simultaneously to 
conserve part of the forest outright and to switch to multistrata agroforestry for the 
rest of the forest.  Farmers were first asked their willingness to accept (WTA) 
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compensation (from electric utilities engaged in carbon offset projects) for the 
combined preservation/agroforestry package, and were then asked by how much 
they would discount the stated WTA to secure access to the environmental 
services of the conserved part of the land. The difference between the two WTA 
measures, gives a willingness to pay measure (i.e. in terms of forgone compen-
sation) for the environmental services. The results were, in average terms: 
 
• $218 compensation required for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be 
converted to outright preservation; 
• $138 compensation for forgoing one hectare of forest that would be converted 
to agroforestry; 
• $67 willingness to pay for environmental services for forest preservation 
• $41 willingness to pay for environmental services for agroforestry. 
 
The difference between the two WTP estimates reveals that farmers are aware of 
the difference in the value of environmental services from agroforestry compared 
to preservation. 
 
The study is significant in that it elicits (a) the compensation farmers would need 
to fill the ‘gap’ between the returns to agroforestry and the returns to slash and 
burn agriculture, and (b) the willingness to pay of farmers for forest services of 
which they are well aware. The gap between agroforestry and slash-and-burn 
returns is a perceived one and is highly influenced by farmers’ discount rates, i.e. 
returns are higher to agroforestry over a long period but lower if the time horizon 
is limited to a few years.  Interestingly, stated WTA to switch to agroforestry 
compared very well with the difference in the annual stream of returns when 
viewed from this short-term perspective, i.e. farmers were well aware of the 
returns from different systems.  
 
The relevance of the study lies mainly in the information provided about farmers’ 
perceptions about the forest, but, in so far as agroforestry can be thought of as a 
form of SFM,  it suggests that the social returns to SFM are higher than slash-and-
burn provided the ‘rest of the world’ is willing to pay for carbon services from the 
forest.  
 
 
9. An Economic Model of Sustainable Forestry 
 
One way of encapsulating the previous discussion is to place it in the context of an 
economic model of forested land use. Annex 3 outlines a model developed by 
Hyde (1999) and to which we have added explicit consideration of non-market 
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values. The essence of the analysis is to show the relevance of sustainable forestry 
in various stages of economic development. Sustainable forestry can only exist if 
returns to it exceed those of alternative uses of the land and exceed the costs of 
management, including the costs of preventing entry by colonists. Hyde suggests 
that these conditions will tend not to prevail in the earlier stages of development 
so that, generally, the poorer the nation the less likely it is for sustainable forestry 
to emerge as a viable land use option. But the analysis also suggests that if non-
market values are high, there could be substantial returns from managing forests 
on a sustainable basis. The additional condition, of course, is that the returns must 
be capable of ‘capture’ by the forest owner, whether it is a private individual or 
the state.  
 
The analysis of Section 8 and Annex 2 suggests that most non-market values will 
not be high enough to change the underlying and somewhat pessimistic 
conclusion of Hyde’s approach, i.e. sustainable forestry is  potentially viable but 
risky in areas where development is still at the early stages. The fairly clear 
exception, however, is carbon, and the few case studies that are relevant seem to 
confirm that carbon values from carbon trading could produce the situation in 
Figure A3.4 in Annex 3 where a significant sustainable forest sector emerges 
based on non-market values. Additionally promising is forest certification, 
depending on the extent to which stated WYP is confirmed by actual WTP. 
 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed the available literature in an attempt to cast some 
light on the issue of the type of forest management regime that is best suited to the 
overall aim of slowing the rate of loss of the world’s forests and biodiversity. The 
traditional argument that ‘sustainable forestry’ is the most preferred option has 
recently come under criticism from those who argue that it is neither profitable nor 
necessarily environmentally preferable to conventional logging.  
 
Finding general conclusions is complex, not least because the terminology in the 
literature is confusing and often value-laden, even down to regarding ‘logging’ as 
an undesirable activity per se (Section 3). While not entirely satisfactory, we adopt 
the language of ‘conventional logging’, ‘sustainable timber management’, 
‘sustainable forest management’ and ‘protection’ (Section 5). The essential 
differences are that sustainable systems have regard to longer term outcomes than 
do conventional systems, and that sustainable systems are likely to involve far 
more regulatory supervision than conventional systems.  
 
The model adopted proceeds from a comparison of financial rates of return to 
differing forest management systems, through to economic rates of return, and 
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from there to wider rate of return concepts that include non-market values, e.g. 
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage. There are then at least three 
stakeholder perspectives on these rates of return: those of the logger, those of the 
nation, and those of the world as a whole. In reality, there are many different 
divisions of interest, from those of illicit forest users, indigenous peoples, enforced 
migrants and so on. The rough benchmark is that forested land should be used for 
the highest social value use, i.e. the use that maximises the broad concept of rate 
of return indicated above.  This notion requires that any values not embodied in 
the market place be ‘captured’ through various incentive mechanisms. Those 
mechanisms - such as debt-for-nature swaps, carbon offsets, green image 
investments etc., - are not discussed here. The idea of maximising a rate of return 
also does not embrace the crucially vital question of the distribution of gains and 
losses. While important, these concerns lie outside the scope of this chapter. 
 
The evidence on financial rates of return is surveyed in Section 7.1. While 
sustainable systems appear capable of earning returns in excess of some ‘modest’ 
discount rate (5%, and in some cases 10%), they do not compete financially with 
other systems. Given the nature of the management process for sustainability, this 
is not unexpected and conforms with the critics’ view of sustainable management. 
 
Are there any factors that mitigate this inequality?  Section 7.2 looks at the various 
arguments that have arisen, from improving concessionaire property rights, to the 
future of timber prices, and the valorisation of non-commercial species. None 
appears to give sustainable timber management any edge over conventional 
systems. All have some role to play, but it is not significant. The evidence on 
discount rates tends to reinforce the critics’ arguments. Recent studies suggest that 
discount rates in poor countries are very high, indeed, so high that few 
investments of any kind, let alone in forestry, would seem to be economically 
justified. But if the focus is on sustainable and unsustainable forest systems, then 
high discount rates simply reinforce the initial preference for conventional 
systems based on rapid liquidation of the timber and other resources without 
regard for future harvests or other impacts. 
 
Some of the critics have argued that logging should be permitted so as to get an 
initial period of damage over and done with, leaving the way open for protection. 
The argument rests on some real possibilities that future logging threats are 
minimised, and land is cheaper once the loggers have gone. Doubts about this 
argument are raised in Section 8.2: logging once may simply lead to subsequent 
visits from the same or other loggers; the way is opened up for colonists; and 
damage may be so extensive that protection ceases to have much of a conservation 
justification. Sustainable systems are also open to threat since they too open up 
forests to colonists. The extent to which they will avoid being converted by 
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colonists rests heavily on their financial viability, which, as we have seen, may not 
be very strong. 
 
The focus therefore shifts to non-market values. Are these higher under 
sustainable management than conventional logging? Our review in Section 8.4 
suggests that they are. It is true that sustainable forestry loses some environmental 
benefits relative to the pre-intervention period.. But there is no necessary link 
between sustainable forestry and environmental damage. Part of the problem 
arises from extrapolating from limited experience, e.g. with mahogany, to tropical 
forestry in general. This said, research on ‘biodiversity impact profiles’ is not 
strong enough yet to reach firm conclusions (Section 8.4.1). For carbon storage, 
the picture seems fairly clearly in favour of sustainable systems. 
 
The final stage of the analysis asks if these non-timber values are sufficiently 
important that they outweigh the financial deficit of sustainable forestry when 
compared to conventional logging. While there is only a limited number of studies 
to guide us in this respect, those that exist seem fairly uniform in finding that the 
non-market benefits of sustainable systems are significant. All tend to acknow-
ledge that timber yields are less on a comparative basis but that non-timber values 
more than offset the relatively lower yield. The role of carbon is highlighted 
because a survey of non-market values suggests that carbon values dominate the 
non-market values overall, a conclusion echoed in the case studies reviewed here. 
Other indirect evidence is also marshalled, e.g. there appears to be a marked 
willingness to pay by consumers for natural regeneration of forests and for 
sustainable managed systems. 
 
Finally, Section 9 and Annex 3 place the analysis in the context of a forest model 
developed by Hyde and extended here. This suggests that the prospects for 
sustainable forest management is low in the early stages of development, and 
increases as the values attached to the forest and its services rises over time. 
Extended to include carbon and biodiversity values, it is arguable that the potential 
for sustainable forestry is far greater, even in the early stages of development, than 
might be thought. 
 
 
References 
 
Adger, A., Brown, K., Cervigni, R., and Moran, D. (1995). Total Economic Value of Forests in 
Mexico, Ambio, 24(5), 286-296. 
 
Aylward, B., and Porras, I. (1998). Analysis of Private and Social Discount Rates in Costa Rica, 
CREED Working Paper No.20, International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment, London 
 
 52 
Bach, C. and Gram, S. (1996). The tropical timber triangle, Ambio, 25(3), 166-170. 
 
Balick M., and Mendelsohn, R. (1992). The Economic Value of Traditional Medicine from 
Tropical Rain Forests, Conservation Biology, 6, 128-139. 
 
Bann, C. (1997). An Economic Assessment of Tropical Forest Land Use Options, Ratanakiri 
Province, Cambodia, EEPSEA Research Report Series,  Economy and Environment 
Program for Southeast Asia, Singapore 
 
Barbier, E., Burgess, J, Bishop, J and Aylward, B., (1994). The Economics of the Tropical 
Timber Trade, Earthscan, London. 
 
Barreto, P., and Amaral, P., Vidal, E., and Uhl, C. (1998). Costs and benefits of forest manage-
ment for timber production in eastern Amazonia, Forest Ecology and Management, 108, 
9-26 
 
Barros, A., and Uhl, C. (1995). Logging along the Amazon river and estuary: patterns, problems 
and potential, Forest Ecology and Management, 77, 87-105. 
 
Bawa, K, and Seidler, R., (1998). Natural forest management and conservation of biodiversity in 
tropical forests, Conservation Biology, 12, 1, 46-55. 
 
Bojo, J. (1993). Economic Valuation of Indigenous Woodlands, in Bradley, P. and McNamara, 
K. (eds), Living With Trees: Policies for Forest Management in Zimbabwe, Technical 
Paper 210, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Boscolo, M and Vincent, J., (1998). Promoting better logging practices in tropical forests: a 
simulation analysis of alternative regulations, Development Discussion Paper 652, 
Harvard Institute for International Development, September. 
 
Bowles, I., Rice, R., Mittermeier, R and da Fonseca, A., (1998). Logging and tropical forest 
conservation, Science, 280, June 19, 1899-1900. 
 
Brown, K., Pearce, D.W., Perrings, C., and Swanson, T., (1993). Economics and the 
Conservation of Global Biological Diversity, Working Paper No.2, Global Environment 
Facility, Washington DC. 
 
Brooks, D., Pajuoja, H., Solberg, B., Wardle, P and Peack, T. (1996).  Long-term Trends and 
Prospects in World Supply and Demand for Wood, Paper to the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Forests, European Forest Institute, Joensuu and Norwegian Forest Research 
Institute, As. 
Browder, J., Matricardi, E and Abdala, W. (1996). Is sustainable tropical timber production 
financially viable? A comparative analysis of mahogany silviculture among small 
farmers in the Brazilian Amazon, Ecological Economics, 16, 147-159. 
 
Bruenig, E.F., (1996). Conservation and Management of Tropical Rainforests, CAB 
International, Wallingford. 
 
 53 
Brown, K., and Pearce, D.W., (1994). The economic value of non-market benefits of tropical 
forests: carbon storage. In, J.Weiss (ed), The Economics of Project Appraisal and the 
Environment, Edward Elgar, London, 102-123. 
 
Buschbacher, R., (1990). Natural forest management in the humid tropics: ecological, social, 
and economic considerations, Ambio, 19(5), August, 253-258 
 
Cannon, J., Gullison, R., and Rice, R. (1998). Conservation and Logging in Tropical Forests, 
Conservation International, for the World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Cervigni, R. (1995). North South Resource Transfers, Incremental Cost and the Rio Environ-
ment Conventions, Global Environmental Change (GEC) Series 95-33, Centre for Social 
and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), University College 
London and University of East Anglia. 
 
Chomitz, K, and Kumari, K. (1996). The Domestic benefits of Tropical Forests: a Critical 
Review, Global Environmental Change (GEC) Series, 96-19, Centre for Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment, (CSERGE), University College London 
and University of East Anglia. 
 
Crook, C., and Clapp R. (1998). Is market oriented forest conservation a contradiction in terms? 
Environmental Conservation, 25(2), 131-145. 
 
Crossley, R., and Points, J. (1998). Investing in Tomorrow’s Forests: Profitability and Sustain-
ability in the Forest Products Industry, WWF, Godalming. 
 
Cruz, W., Francisco, H., and Conway, Z. (1988). The On-site and Downstream Costs of Soil 
Erosion in the Magat and Pantabangan Watersheds, Journal of Philippine Development, 
XV, No.1, 85-112. 
 
Cuesta, M., Carlson, G., and Lutz, E. (1994). An Empirical Assessment of Farmers’ Discount 
Rates in Costa Rica and its Implications for Soil Conservation, World Bank, 
Washington DC, mimeo 
 
Dickinson, M., Dickinson, J and Putz, F. (1996). Natural forest management as a conservation 
tool in the tropics: divergent views on possibilities and alternatives, Commonwealth 
Forestry Review, 75(4), 309-315. 
 
Dixon, J., Paredes, G., and Donoso, C. (1994). Native Forest management Options in Southern 
Chile: Assessing Trade-Offs Between Income and Biodiversity, World Bank, Washing-
ton DC, mimeo. 
 
Dixon, R. (1997). Silvicultural options to conserve and sequester carbon in forest systems: 
preliminary economic assessment, Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and 
Technology, 27 (special), S139-S149. 
 
Eade, J. (1995). Spatial Economic Valuation: Benefits Transfer Using Geographical Inform-
ation Systems, World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, mimeo. 
 
 54 
Eyre, N., Downing, T., Hoekstra, R., Rennings, K., and Tol, R. (1997). Global Warming 
Damages, Final Report of the ExternE Global Warming Sub-Task, DGXII, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
 
Faeth, P., Cort, C., and Livernash, R. (1994). Evaluating the Carbon Sequestration Benefits of 
Sustainable Forestry Projects in Developing Countries, Earthscan, London. 
 
Fankhauser, S., and Pearce, D.W. (1994). The Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. In 
OECD, The Economics of Climate Change, OECD, Paris, 71-86. 
 
Fankhauser, S. (1995). Valuing Climate Change, Earthscan, London. 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), (1997). Environmentally sound forest harvesting: 
testing the applicability of the FAO model code in the Amazon in Brazil, FAO Forest 
Harvesting Case Study 8, FAO, Rome.  
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), (1999). Sustainable Forest Management: Issues 
Paper, FAO, Rome.  
 
Frumhoff, P. (1996). Conserving wildlife in tropical forests managed for timber, Bioscience, 
45(7), 456-464. 
 
Frumhoff, P., and Losos, E. (1998). Setting Priorities for Conserving Biological Diversity in 
Tropical Timber Production Forests, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Smithsonian 
Institution, Washington DC. 
 
Godoy, R., and Lubowski, R. (1992). Guidelines for the Economic Valuation of Non-timber 
Tropical-Forest Products, Current Anthropology, 33 (4), August-October, 423-433. 
 
Godoy, R., Lubowski, R., and Markandya, A. (1993). A Method for the Economic Valuation of 
Non-timber Tropical Forest Products, Economic Botany, 47 (3), 220-233. 
 
Gregersen, H., Arnold, J., Lundgren, A., and Contreras-Hermosilla, A. (1995). Valuing Forests: 
Context, Issues and Guidelines, FAO Forestry Paper 127, FAO, Rome. 
 
Grut, M. (1990). Economics of Managing the African Rainforest, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Gullison, R. (1995). Conservation of Tropical Forests Through the Sustainable Production of 
Forest Products, PhD Thesis, Princeton University. 
 
Gullison, R., and Hardner, J. (1993). The effects of road design and harvest intensity on forest 
damage caused by selective logging: empirical results and a simulation model from the 
Bosque Chimanes, Bolivia, Forest Ecology and Management, 59, 1-14. 
Gullison, R., Westbrook, T., Nissan, S., Grieg-Gran, M., Hocking, D., Ecosecurities Ltd, and 
Cannon, J. (1998). The Potential for UK Portfolio Investors to Finance Sustainable 
Tropical Forestry, International Institute for Environment and Development, 
Environmental Economics Programme, Discussion Paper 98-03, London. 
 
Haltia, O., and Keipi, K. (1997). Financing Forest Investments in Latin America: the Issue of 
Incentives, Environment Division, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC. 
 55 
 
Hardner, J., and Rice, R. (1994). Financial Constraints  to Sustainable Selective Harvesting of 
Forests in Eastern Amazon, Development Strategies for Fragile Lands, USAID, 
Washington DC. 
 
Houghton, K., and Mendelsohn, R. (1996). An Economic Analysis of Multiple Use Forestry in 
Nepal. Ambio, 25 (3), May, 156-159. 
 
Howard, A., Rice, R., and Gullison, R. (1996). Simulated financial returns and selected environ-
mental impacts from four alternative silvicultural prescriptions applied to the neo-
tropics: a case study of the Chimanes Forest, Bolivia, Forest Ecology Management, 89,  
43-57. 
 
Howard, A., and Valerio, J. (1996). Financial returns from sustainable forest management and 
selected agricultural land use options in Costa Rica, Forest Ecology and Management, 
81, 35-49. 
 
Hunter, I. (1998). Multiple-use forest management systems, in See, L., May, D., Gauld, I., and 
Bishop, J., (eds.), Conservation, Management and Development of Forest Resources, 
Forest Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 169-177. 
 
Hyde, W. (1999). Patterns of forest development, lecture given at IIED, London, April 1999. 
 
Hyde, W., and Sedjo, R. (1992). Managing tropical forests: reflections on the rent distribution 
discussion, Land Economics, 68, 3, 343-50 
 
Hyde, W., and Sedjo, R. (1993). Managing tropical forests: reply, Land Economics, 69, 3, 319-
21. 
 
Hyde, W., Amacher, G., and Magrath, W. (1996). Deforestation and forest land use. Theory, 
evidence and policy implications. World Bank Research Observer, 11, 2, August, 223-
248. 
 
Hyde, W., Newman, D., and Sedjo, R. (1991). Forest Economics and Policy Analysis, World 
Bank Discussion Papers 134, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
IFF (Intergovernmental Panel on Forests), Valuation of Forest Goods and Services: Report of 
the Secretary General, United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, New 
York, Report E/CN.17/IFF/1999.12. 
 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (1996). Second Assessment Report, 
Volume I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Johns, J., Barreto, P., and Uhl, C. (1996). Logging damage during planned and unplanned 
logging operations in eastern Amazonia, Forest Ecology and Management, 89, 59-77. 
 
Kaimowitz, D., and Angelsen, A. (1998). Economic Models of Deforestation: a Review, CIFOR, 
Bogor, Indonesia. 
 
 56 
Kant, S., Nautiyal, J., and Berry, R. (1996). Forests and Economic Welfare. Journal of 
Economic Studies, 23 (2), 31-43. 
 
Kishor, J., and Constantino, L. (1993). Forest Management and Competing Land Uses: an 
Economic Analysis for Costa Rica, LATEN Dissemination Note, World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
 
Kollert, W., Uebelhor, K, and Kleine, M. (1995). Financial Analysis of Natural Forest Manage-
ment on a Sustained Yield Basis: a Case Study for Deramakot Forest Reserve, Report 
200. 
 
Kramer, R., Sharma, N., and Munasinghe, M. (1995). Valuing Tropical Forests: Methodology 
and Case Study of Madagascar, Environment Paper No.13, World Bank, Washington 
DC. 
 
Kramer, R., Mercer, E., and Sharma, N. (1994). Valuing Tropical Rain Forest Protection Using 
the Contingent Valuation Method, School of the Environment, Duke University, 
Durham, NC. Mimeo. 
 
Krutilla, J. (1967). Conservation Reconsidered. American Economic Review, 57, 777-786. 
 
Kumari, K. (1995). An Environmental and Economic Assessment of Forest management 
Options: a Case Study of Malaysia, Environment Department Working Paper 026, 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Kumari, K. (1996). Sustainable forest management: myth or reality? Exploring the prospects for 
Malaysia, Ambio, 25 (7), 459-467. 
 
Laarman, J. (1995). The economics of extraction in Philippine forests: when timber turns to 
gold, Mountain Research and Development, 15 (2), 153-164. 
 
Ladrach, W., and Wright, J. (1995). Natural regeneration in a secondary Colombian rain forest: 
its implications for natural forest management in the tropics, Journal of Sustainable 
Forestry, 3 (1), 15-38. 
 
Lampietti, J., and Dixon, J. (1995). To See the Forest for the Trees: A Guide to non-Timber 
Forest Benefits, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Leslie, A.J. (1987). A second look at the economics of natural management systems in tropical 
mixed forests, Unasylva, 155,  46-58. 
 
Magrath, W., and Arens, P. (1989). The Costs of Soil Erosion on Java: a Natural Resource 
Accounting Approach, Working Paper No.18, Environment Department, World Bank, 
Washington DC.  
Manokaran, N. (1998). Effect, 34 years later, of selective logging in the lowland dipterocarp 
forest of Pasoh, Peninsular Malaysia, and implications of present day logging in the hill 
forests, in L.See, D.May, I.Gauld and J.Bishop (eds.), Conservation, Management and 
Development of Forest Resources, Forest Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 41-60. 
 
 57 
Mattsson, L., and Li, C-Z. (1994). How do different forest management practices affect the non-
timber value of forests? An economic analysis, Journal of Environmental Management, 
41, 79-88. 
 
Mendelsohn, R., and Balick, M. (1995). The value of undiscovered pharmaceuticals in tropical 
forests. Economic Botany, 49 (2), 223-228. 
 
Mendoza, G., and Ayemou, A. (1992). Analysis of some forest management strategies in Cote 
d’Ivoire: a regional case study, Forest Ecology and Management, 47, 149-174. 
 
Mourato, S. (1999).  Do slash and burn farmers value forest preservation? Evidence from the 
Peruvian Amazon, Chapter 2 of Ph D thesis, Essays in Contingent Valuation, University 
College London. 
 
Myers, N. (1984). The Primary Source: Tropical Forests and Our Future, Norton, New York. 
 
Panayotou, T., and Ashton, P. (1992). Not by Timber Alone: Economics and Ecology for 
Sustaining Tropical Forests, Island Press, Washington DC. 
 
Pearce, D.W. (1986). Cost-Benefit Analysis, Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
 
Pearce, D.W. (1993). Economic Values and the Natural World, Earthscan, London. 
 
Pearce, D.W. (1996). Global environmental value and the tropical forests: demonstration and 
capture, in Adamowicz, W., Boxall, P., Luckett, M., Phillips, W., and White, W. (eds), 
Forestry, Economics and the Environment, CAB International, Wallingford. 
 
Pearce, D.W. (1998). Can non-market values save the tropical forest? In B.Goldsmith (ed), 
Tropical Rain Forest: a Wider Perspective,  Chapman and Hall, London, 255-268. 
 
Pearce, D.W., (1999). Economics and Environment: Essays on Ecological Economics and 
Sustainable Development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 
Pearce, D.W., and Moran, D. (1994). The Economic Value of Biodiversity. Earthscan, London. 
 
Pearce, D.W., and Puroshothaman, S. (1995). The Economic Value of Plant-based Pharmaceut-
icals, in Swanson, T. (ed), Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 127-138. 
 
Pearce, D.W., Day, B., Newcombe, J., Brunello, A., and Bello, T. (1998). The Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism: Benefits of the CDM for Developing Countries, Centre for Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), University College London 
for the Department for International Development. 
 
Pearce, D.W., Krug, W., and Moran, D. (1999). The Global Value of Biodiversity, A Report to 
UNEP, Nairobi. 
 
Perez, M.R., and Byron, N. (1999). A methodology to analyze divergent case studies of non-
timber forest products and their development potential, Forest Science, 45 (1), 1-14. 
 
 58 
Perman, R., Ma, Y., and McGilvray, J. (1999). Natural Resource and Environmental 
Economics, Longman, Harlow, 2nd edition. 
 
Peters, C.M, Gentry, A, and Mendelsohn, G. (1989). Valuation of an Amazonian rainforest, 
Nature, 339, 655-656. 
 
Phillips, O. (1993). The potential for harvesting fruits in tropical rainforests: new data from 
Amazonian Peru, Biodiversity and Conservation, 2, 18-38. 
 
Pinedo-Vazquez, M., Zarin, and Jipp, P. (1992). Economic returns from forest conversion in the 
Peruvian Amazon, Ecological Economics, 6, 163-173. 
 
Pinedo-Vazquez, M., and Rabelo, F. (1999). Sustainable management of an Amazonian forest 
for timber production: myth or reality?, PLEC News and Views, 12, 20-28. 
 
Poore, D., Burgess, P., Palmer, J., Rietbergen, S., and Synnott, T. (1989). No Timber Without 
Trees:  Sustainability in the Tropical Forest, Earthscan, London. 
 
Poulos, C., and Whittington, D. (1999). Individuals’ time preferences for life saving programs: 
results from six less developed countries, Department of Environmental Sciences and 
Engineering,  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, May, mimeograph. 
 
Putz, F. (1992). Unnecessary rifts, Conservation Biology, 6, 301-2. 
 
Putz, F., Dykstra, D., Zweede, J., and Heinrich, R. (1999). Why poor logging persists in the 
tropics, Conservation Biology, forthcoming.  
 
Putz, J., Sirot, L.K., and Pinard, M.A. (1999). Tropical forest management and wildlife: silvi-
cultural effects on forest structure, fruit production and locomotion of non-volant 
arboreal animals, in Fimbel, R., Grajal, A., and Robinson, J. (eds), Conserving Wildlife 
in Managed Tropical Forests, Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Reid, J., and Howard, A. (1994). Economic Analysis of the Proposed Timber Concession at 
Arroyo Colorado: Are There Incentives for management? Report to USAID by 
Conservation International, Washington DC. 
 
Repetto, R. (1990). Deforestation in the tropics, Scientific American, 262 (4), 36-42. 
 
Reid, J., and Rice, R. (1997). Assessing natural forest management as a tool for tropical forest 
conservation, Ambio, 26 (6), 382-386. 
 
Rice, R., Gullison, R., and Reid, J. (1997). Can sustainable management save tropical forests?, 
Scientific American, 276, 34-39. 
 
Rice, R., Sugal, C., and Bowles, I. (1998a). Sustainable Forest Management: a Review of the 
Current Conventional Wisdom, Conservation International, Washington DC. 
 
Rice, R., Sugal, C., Frumhoff, P., and Losos, E. (1998b). Options for conserving biodiversity in 
the context of logging in tropical forests, in Prickett, G., and Bowles, I., (eds), Footprints 
 59 
in the Jungle: Natural Resource Industries, Infrastructure and Biodiversity Conser-
vation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
 
Richards, E.M. (1991). The forest ejidos of southeast Mexico: a case study of community based 
sustained yield management, Commonwealth Forestry Review, 70 (4), 20-311. 
 
Romero, C. (1999). Reduced impact logging effects on commercial non-vascular pendant 
epiphyte biomass in a tropical forest in Costa Rica, Forest Ecology and Management. 
 
Ruitenbeek, J. (1992). The Rainforest Supply Price, Ecological Economics, 1 (6), 57-78. 
 
Salick, J. (1995). Non-timber forest products integrated with natural forest management, Eco-
logical Applications, 5, 922-954. 
 
Schneider, R. (1995). Government and the Economy on the Amazon Frontier, Environment 
Paper No.11, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Sedjo, R., Wisniewski, J., Sample, A., and Kinsman, J. (1995). The economics of managing 
carbon via forestry: assessment of existing studies, Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 6, 139-165. 
 
Shahwahid, M., Noor, A., Rahim, A., Zulkifli, Y., and Ragame, U. (1997). Economic Benefits of 
Watershed Protection and Trade-Off with Timber Production: a Case Study of Malaysia, 
EEPSEA Research Report Series, Economy and Environment Program for South-East 
Asia, Singapore. 
 
Shahwahid, M., Noor, A., Rahim, A., Zulkifli, Y., and Ujang, R. (1998). Watershed protection 
versus timber production in the Hulu Langat forest reserve, in See, L., May, D., Gauld, 
L., and Bishop, J., (eds.), Conservation, Management and Development of Forest 
Resources, Forest Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 290-299. 
 
Simpson, R., Sedjo, R and Reid, J. (1994). Valuing Biodiversity: an Application to Genetic 
Prospecting, Discussion Paper 94-20, Resources for the Future, Washington DC. 
 
Smith, J., Mulongoy, K., Persson, R., and Sayer, J. (1999). Harnessing carbon markets for 
tropical forest conservation: towards a more realistic assessment, Centre for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jakarta, mimeo. 
 
Smith, J., Mourato, S., Veneklaas, E., Labarta, R., Reategui, K., and Sanchez, G. (1999b). 
Willingness to pay for environmental services among slash and burn farmers in the 
Peruvian Amazon: implications for deforestation and global environmental markets, 
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, University 
College London and University of East Anglia, mimeo. 
 
Sohngen, B., Mendelsohn, R., and Sedjo, R. (1998). The effectiveness of forest carbon 
sequestration strategies with system-wide adjustments, Resources for the Future, 
Washington DC, mimeo. 
 
 60 
Solberg, B. (1997). Forest biomass as carbon sink – economic value and forest management/ 
policy implications, Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology, 27 
(special), S323-333. 
 
Southgate, D. (1998). Tropical Forest Conservation: An Economic Assessment of the 
Alternatives in Latin America, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Southgate, D. (1996). What Roles Can Ecotourism, Non-timber Extraction, Genetic Prospect-
ing, and Sustainable Timber Play in an Integrated Strategy for Habitat Conservation 
and Local Development ? Department of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University, 
Report to Inter-American Development Bank, mimeo. 
 
Southgate, D., and Elgegren, J. (1995). Development of tropical timber resources by local 
communities: a case study from the Peruvian Amazon, Commonwealth Forestry Review, 
74 (2), 142-146. 
 
Southgate, D., Coles-Ritchie, M., and Salazar-Canelos, P. (1996). Can tropical forests be saved 
by harvesting non-timber products? Global Environmental Change (GEC) Series 96-02, 
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), 
University College London and University of East Anglia. 
 
Stephens, M. (1999). The marginal costs of a safe minimum standard for an endangered arboreal 
species, Department of Forestry, Australian National University, Canberra, mimeo. 
 
Stone, S. (1996). Economic Trends in the Timber Industry of the Brazilian Amazon: Evidence 
from Paragominas, CREED Working Paper No. 6, International Institute for Environ-
ment and Development, London. 
 
Swanson, T. (1994). The International Regulation of Extinction, Macmillan, London. 
 
Tobias, D., and Mendelsohn, R. (1991). Valuing Ecotourism in a Tropical Rain-Forest Reserve, 
Ambio, 20 (2), April, 91-2. 
 
Toman, M., and Ashton, M. (1994). Sustainable forest ecosystems and management: a review 
article, Discussion Paper 94-42, Resources for the Future, Washington DC. 
 
Uhl, C., Verissimo, A., Mattos, M., Brandino, Z., Vieira, I. (1991). Social, economic and eco-
logical consequences of selective logging in an Amazon frontier: the case of Tailandia, 
Forest Ecology and Management, 46, 243-273. 
 
US Administration, (1998). The Kyoto Protocol and the President’s Policies to Address Climate 
Change: Administration Economic Analysis, White House, Washington  DC. 
 
Vanclay, J. (1994). Modeling Forest Growth and Yield: Applications to Mixed Tropical Forests, 
CB International, Wallingford. 
 
Vanclay, J. (1994). Sustainable timber harvesting: simulation studies in the tropical rainforests 
of north Queensland, Forest Ecology and Management, 69, 299-320 
 
 61 
Vanclay, J. (1996). Assessing the sustainability of timber harvests from natural forests: 
limitations of indices based on successive harvests, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 3, 
47-58. 
 
Vanclay, J. (1996). Lessons from the Queensland rainforests: steps towards sustainability, 
Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 3, 1-17. 
 
Verissimo, A., Barreto, P., Mattos, M., Tarifa, R., and Uhl, C. (1992). Logging impacts and 
prospects for sustainable forest management in an old Amazonian frontier: the case of 
Paragominas, Forest Ecology and Management, 55, 169-199. 
 
Verissimo, A., Barreto, P., Tarifa, R., and Uhl, C. (1995). Extraction of a high value natural 
resource from Amazonia: the case of mahogany, Forest Ecology and Management, 72, 
39-60. 
 
Vincent, J. (1992). The tropical timber trade and sustainable development, Science, 256, 1651. 
 
Vincent, J. (1993). Managing tropical forests: comment, Land Economics,  69 (3), 313-18. 
 
Whitmore, T.C. (1999). Arguments on the forest frontier, Biodiversity and Conservation, 
forthcoming.  
 
World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development (WCFSD), (1999). Our Forests 
Our Future, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), (1996). WWF Guide to Forest Certification, WWF, 
Godalming. 
 
 62 
 Annex 1: Discounting 
 
Let the profit from SFM be $Ys every year. Then the present value of this profit 
is: 
 
PVs = ΣYs/(1+r)t = Ys(1+r)/r 
 
Let the profit from CL be characterized as an initial profit in the first year of Yu 
which ‘decays’ over time at rate d. Then  
 
PVu = ΣYu(1-d)t/(1+r)t = Yu(1+r)/(r+d) 
 
We can find the rate of discount at which these two profit streams are equal, i.e. 
the rate of discount at which the land user should be indifferent between SFM and 
CL. This is given by 
 
PVs = Pvu, or 
 
Ys(1+r)/r = Yu (1+r)/(r+d) 
 
Such that r = d.Ys/(Yu-Ys) 
 
Suppose d = 20%, i.e. in roughly 5 years the logger leaves the area. Let Ys = 
0.5Yu, i.e. SFM secures yields in the first year of just one half of those from CL. 
Then, r = 20%. If r>20%, CL is preferred to SFM, and if r < 20% SFM is 
preferred to CL. 
 
 
Annex 2: Non-timber economic values
12
 
 
In their survey of non-timber benefits, Lampietti and Dixon (1995) divide non-
timber values into extractive, non-extractive and preservation values. Extractive 
values involve an actual harvest, e.g. of nuts or rattan. Non-extractive values 
should be more correctly titled non-extractive use values since they involve use 
but not harvest of the forest. They include recreation and tourism, but also the 
indirect ecological functions of forests such as watershed protection and carbon 
storage. Preservation values are what most now call non-use or passive use values. 
 
                                                 
12 It is important to understand that identifying non-timber values is only part of the overall 
analysis required to establish whether or not such values will contribute to sustainable forest use. 
Market conditions, macroeconomic policy, property rights etc. all matter. See Pérez and Byron 
(1999). 
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Extractive Values 
 
Taking extractive values first, Lampietti and Dixon note that most of the studies 
relate to Central and South America (14 studies out of 20 analysed). Average per 
hectare values come to $86-101 per annum for Central and South America and 
$60-65 for Asian countries. The Central and South American results are 
exaggerated by the Peters et al., (1989) study which has been severely criticised 
(Godoy et al., 1993; Southgate, 1996). Godoy et al., (1993) report 23 different 
estimates from studies which only partially overlap with those reported in 
Lampietti and Dixon (1995). The authors resist the temptation to average the 
results since they are more concerned to identify differences in methodology and 
errors as factors accounting for the variation in values. Ignoring the caveats, an 
average of $50 per hectare per year is obtained (Pearce and Moran, 1994). Some 
more recent studies suggest higher extractive values. Thus, Adger et al., (1995) 
report values from just 2 US cents per hectare up to $1537 for te'lom grove 
(groves in rainforests) management and coffee growing, and around $6 ha  pa for 
pharmaceuticals in Mexico. Bojö (1993) reports extractive values in private 
woodlands in Zimbabwe of US$39 per hectare. An extensive study by Kramer et 
al., (1995) of the Mantadia National Park in Madagascar found that villagers 
would lose around $91 per household per year from forgone forest products (rice, 
fuelwood, crayfish, crab, tenreck and frogs). This converts to just $3.2 per 
hectare13. In contrast, Houghton and Mendelsohn (1996) find present values of 
fodder, fuelwood and timber (mainly the first two) of $2200-3600 per hectare for 
the Nepalese Middle Hills, or around $176 - 288 per hectare in annuity form (at a 
5% discount rate). 
 
With regard to pharmaceutical products, the subject of extensive debate, Pearce 
and Puroshothaman (1995) suggest values of $0.01 to $21 per ha per year, based 
on established probabilities of finding a successful drug from plant species 
currently at risk. This assumes a tropical forest area of 1 billion hectares. 
Ruitenbeek (1989) has rough estimates of medicinal plant value in the Korup 
forest, Cameroun, which translate to around $0.2 to $0.7 per hectare. Using a very 
different approach, Simpson et al., (1994) suggest that, taking an optimistic point 
of view, a pharmaceutical company's willingness to pay would be a maximum of 
$20 per hectare in Western Ecuador and very much less, perhaps $1 per hectare, 
elsewhere. Thus, adopting different approaches, these studies produce very low 
values for pharmaceutical values. Mendelsohn and Balick (1995) suggest a value 
of undiscovered tropical forest drugs to the pharmaceutical companies of $2.8-4.1 
billion. They divide this by 3.1 billion hectares of tropical forest to obtain average 
values of $0.9 to $1.3 per hectare. The 3.1 billion hectares figures appears to be an 
                                                 
    13 $91 x 351 households = $31,941 across an area of 9,875 hectares = $3.2 per hectare. 
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exaggeration, whereas the Pearce-Puroshothaman (1995) estimate appears too 
low. Using a figure of 1.7 billion hectares of total tropical forest, the Pearce-
Puroshothaman figures would reduce further to a range of nearly zero to $12.3 per 
hectare, and the Mendelsohn-Balick figures would rise to $1.6 to $2.4 per 
hectare14. The high values of Pearce-Puroshothaman reflect values to society 
rather than values to drug companies, i.e. values based on lives saved and the 
value of a statistical life15. The comparable Mendelsohn Balick figure for social 
values would be around 50 times the private willingness to pay figure. It seems 
clear that pharmaceutical values will not 'save' tropical forests unless the social 
value of genetic material is translated into private willingness to pay.  
 
Overall, the conclusions on extractivism appear to be that, in some circumstances, 
there are high values to be obtained and these may help the case for conservation 
or sustainable management16. Average values have little general meaning but, 
such as they are, the estimates suggest that $50 per hectare may be a very rough 
rule of thumb, but there are clearly situations in which higher values can be 
achieved and others where $50 will seriously exaggerate the net revenues. As a 
general rule, however, limited faith can be put in non-timber extractive values to 
save tropical forests. This contrasts with some of the grander claims made in the 
past (Myers, 1984; Peters et al., 1989). Southgate (1996) warns against the 
exaggerated view that South American extractivists can live by non-timber 
products alone - they will invariably deforest as well - and against the assumption 
that extractivism is inevitably sustainable. Extractivists tend to be poor. Net 
returns to vegetable ivory collection in Ecuador and rubber tapping in the Amazon 
basin, for example, tend to be only just above the opportunity cost of labour.  
  
Non-Extractive Values 
Non-extractive values tend to comprise recreation and indirect ecological 
functions such as watershed protection and carbon storage. Of these, recreation 
and carbon storage have attracted the most study.  
 
                                                 
    
14 In contrast, Balick and Mendelsohn (1992) suggest annual net revenues of $19-61 per 
hectare for Belize.   
15  A ‘statistical life’ refers to the value that would be assigned to a single (anonymous) life if 
each individual’s WTP for a given risk reduction is aggregated over a given population. 
Thus, if each individual has a WTP of $5 to secure a risk reduction of 0.001, the 
aggregate value of risk is 5/0.001 = $5000 . 
 
    16 We abstract from an alternative argument which would express NTVs as a percentage 
of household income. Kant et al., (1996) show that household incomes in West Bengal 
are increased by 20-30% because of income from non-timber products, and that the 
effect is biggest for the poorest households. 
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Adger et al., (1995) suggest ecotourism values for Mexican forests of some $8 ha 
pa, whilst Tobias and Mendelsohn (1991) use the travel cost method to obtain 
values of $52 per hectare for Monteverde in Costa Rica. One would expect high 
values for rare ecosystems such as the montane cloud forest of Monteverde. 
Kumari (1995) estimated a potential recreational value of M$57 ha for her study 
site in Malaysia, but in present value terms and at 8% discount rate. The cash 
flows suggest an annual income of about $5 per hectare. For 'conventional' 
tropical forest, then, values of $5-10 ha might seem appropriate but it has to be 
stressed that such values are location-specific. Vast tracts of forest will attract no 
tourist value at all. 
 
Lampietti and Dixon (1995) find a limited number of studies dealing with erosion 
prevention and which are capable of estimation of benefits on a per hectare basis. 
Magrath and Arens' (1989) study of soil erosion in Java suggests minimum 
estimates of damage of $2-7 per hectare. Cruz et al's (1988) study of Philippines 
suggests $17-28 per ha; Ruitenbeek's (1992) Korup study implies $14 per ha for 
fisheries protection and $2 per ha for flood control. To these estimates we can add 
Kumari's (1995) detailed analysis for Malaysia. This suggests hydrological 
benefits in terms of conserved agricultural output equal to $25 ha pa. Domestic 
water benefits and fisheries protection would add a further $2-3 in each case. 
Overall, then, watershed protection functions do seem to have values which 
cluster around $30 ha pa once a reasonably wide range of functions is 
considered17. 
 
Unquestionably the largest value dominating the use values of tropical forests is 
that relating to carbon sequestration. Lampietti and Dixon's values for this 
function are too low due to the adoption of somewhat outdated estimates of the 
marginal damage from carbon dioxide releases. All forests store carbon so that, if 
cleared for agriculture there will be a release of carbon dioxide which will 
contribute to the accelerated greenhouse effect and hence global warming. In 
order to derive a value for the 'carbon credit' that should be ascribed to a tropical 
forest, we need to know (a) the net carbon released when forests are converted to 
other uses, and (b) the economic value of one tonne of carbon released to the 
atmosphere. 
 
Carbon will be released at different rates according to the method of clearance and 
subsequent land use.  With burning there will be an immediate release of CO2 into 
the atmosphere, and some of the remaining carbon will be locked in ash and 
charcoal which is resistant to decay.  The slash not converted by fire into CO2 or 
                                                 
    
17 In contrast, however, Adger et al's study for Mexico  suggests just 4 cents per hectare 
for watershed protection.  
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charcoal and ash decays over time, releasing most of its carbon to the atmosphere 
within 10-20 years. Studies of tropical forests indicate that significant amounts of 
cleared vegetation become lumber, slash, charcoal and ash; the proportion differs 
for closed and open forests;  the smaller stature and drier climate of open forests 
result in the combustion of higher proportion of the vegetation. 
 
If tropical forested land is  converted to pasture or permanent agriculture, then the 
amount of carbon stored in secondary vegetation is equivalent to the carbon 
content of the biomass of crops planted, or the grass grown on the pasture.  If a 
secondary forest is allowed to grow, then carbon will accumulate, and maximum 
biomass density is attained after a relatively short time.  
 
Table A.2.1 illustrates the net carbon storage effects of land use conversion from 
tropical forests; closed primary, closed secondary, or open forests; to shifting 
cultivation, permanent agriculture, or pasture. The negative figures represent 
emissions of carbon; for example, conversion from closed primary forest to 
shifting agriculture results in a net loss of 194 tC/ha. The greatest loss of carbon 
involves change of land use from primary closed forest to permanent agriculture. 
These figures represent the once and for all change that will occur in carbon 
storage as a result of the various land use conversions. 
 
The data suggest that, allowing for the carbon fixed by subsequent land uses, 
carbon released from deforestation of secondary and primary tropical forest is of 
the order of 100-200 tonnes of carbon per hectare. 
 
The carbon released from burning tropical forests contributes to global warming, 
and we now have several estimates of the minimum economic damage done by 
global warming, leaving aside catastrophic events. Recent work suggests a 
'central' value of $20 of damage for every tonne of carbon released (Fankhauser 
and Pearce, 1994). More recent work still suggests that this value may be higher at 
$30 to $40 tC in current price terms (Eyre et al., 1997). Being conservative, and 
applying the $20 tC figure to the data in Table A.2.1, we can conclude that 
converting an open forest to agriculture or pasture would result in global warming 
damage of, say, $600-1000 per hectare; conversion of closed secondary forest 
would cause damage of $2000-3000 per hectare; and conversion of primary forest 
to agriculture would give rise to damage of about $4000 - 4400 per hectare. Note 
that these estimates allow for carbon fixation in the subsequent land use. 
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Table A.2.1 Changes in carbon stored with forest land use conversion 
 
 (t/C/ha) 
 Original C Shifting 
Agriculture 
Permanent 
Agriculture 
Pasture 
Original C     
Closed primary 283 -204 -220 -220 
Closed secondary 194 -106 -152 -122 
Open forest 115 -36 -52 -52 
 
Source: Brown and Pearce (1994) 
Note: Shifting agriculture represents carbon in biomass and soils in second year of 
shifting cultivation cycle. 
 
 
There are problems with these values of the indirect carbon storage functions of 
tropical forests. First, the estimates of carbon release are uncertain, while the 
estimates of the economic value of carbon are even more uncertain. The $20 per 
tonne carbon value is the product of a Monte Carlo simulation so that it 
encompasses a good deal of the uncertainty about impacts and values, but it does 
not deal with the potential for surprises or extreme events (Fankhauser, 1995). 
Second, even if the values are broadly correct and global warming is a 'real' 
phenomenon, the avoidance of deforestation or investment in avoided logging or 
forest damage may not be cheapest ways of reducing carbon emissions. The 
opportunity cost of conservation is clearly the 'development' benefit forgone, i.e. 
the returns to forest clearance for agriculture, timber or livestock. It seems very 
likely that these forgone values are indeed very low in many cases. For example, 
Schneider (1992) reports upper bound values of $300 per hectare for land in 
Rondonia, Brazil. The figures suggest carbon credit values 2-15 times the price of 
land in Rondonia. These 'carbon credits' also compare favourably with the value 
of forest land for timber as implied by the returns in Table 1. If land is worth $300 
per hectare in a development use, then the cost of conservation on global warming 
grounds becomes, say, $3 per tonne carbon ($300 divided by 100 t/ha, say). If the 
land is worth $2000, then carbon conservation costs $20 per tC. The latter cost is 
certainly not the cheapest way of conserving carbon, but $3 per tonne could be 
very attractive. Existing carbon trades under joint implementation initiatives range 
widely but ‘rule of thumb’ prices centre on $5-10 TCP (Pearce et al., 1999). 
 
Non-use Values 
The final category of value in the Lampietti-Dixon survey is preservation value, 
by which is meant passive or non-use value. The only estimate of such value for 
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tropical forests is that of Kramer et al. (1994). This reports average WTP of US 
citizens for protection of an additional 5% of the world's tropical forests. One time 
payments amounted to $29-51 per US household, or $2.6-4.6 billion. If this WTP 
was extended to all OECD households, and ignoring income differences, a broad 
order of magnitude would be a one-off payment of $11 - 23 billion. Annuitised, 
this would be, say, $1.1 to 2.3 billion p.a. Taking 1.7 billion hectares as the area 
for total tropical forest, 5% of it would come to 85 million hectares, so that annual 
willingness to pay would be $13 to $27 ha. Obviously, the assumptions being 
made here are fairly heroic, but they bear comparison with some of the use values 
identified above, and also pale into insignificance when compared to the carbon 
storage values. 
 
Pearce (1996) looks at other potential estimates of global value. One approach is 
to see what the values for 'similar assets' would imply. Willingness to pay studies 
for the conservation of biological resources suggest average payments of perhaps 
$10 p.a. per person. This would produce a fund of $4 billion p.a. when applied to 
OECD households. This would translate to around $2.3 per hectare if applied to 
all tropical forest. An alternative is to look at implicit prices in debt-for-nature 
swaps. How far the procedure of estimating implicit prices of this kind is open to 
doubt, although it has been used by some writers - see Ruitenbeek (1992) and 
Pearce and Moran (1994). The range of implicit values is from around 1 cent/ha to 
just over 4 dollars/ha (Pearce, 1996).     
 
The estimates of non-use value are clearly very speculative and it is not even clear 
that the methodologies in question are eliciting non-use rather than some mixture 
of use and non-use values. As we have seen, the only direct approach based on 
contingent valuation suggests fairly significant values of $13-27 ha for a small 
part of the total forest stock. The more indirect approaches suggest very much 
lower values of perhaps one tenth of the direct values. 
 
 
Annex 3 The economics of forest land use: the Hyde model 
 
 
This annex outlines an analytical framework developed by Hyde et al (1996) and 
Hyde (1999), but includes a more explicit treatment of non-market values. 
 
A distinction is made between three contexts: in the first the forest within the 
agricultural frontier is cleared and the residual, i.e. remaining  forest, is not 
colonised. In the second case, forest values rise as people demand timber wood 
and fuelwood but no ‘forest sector’ emerges. In the third case forest values rise 
again, creating the conditions for a sustainable forest sector. These three contexts 
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are depicted in Figures A3.1-A3.3. Other forest values – fruits, nuts, latex etc.- 
could be described in the same manner. 
 
In each case, monetary values are measured on the vertical axis and distance from 
the initial site of origin is measured on the horizontal axis. NAV is the net 
agricultural value of the land; NFV is the net forest value of the land; MC is the 
marginal cost of securing rights to the land.  
 
In Figure A3.1 NAV lies wholly outside the NFV curve so that crops are grown 
on ‘secure’ land up to the point D1 where MC just equals NAV. Pasture or  
grazing (and perhaps crops) take place on the area D1D2, but access is open and 
not subject to private rights. The residual standing forest exists from D2 to Dz. 
NFV lies wholly inside NAV so that the standing forest is degraded up to D2. 
 
In Figure A3.2 NFV shifts outwards since there is a demand for wood (timber, 
fuelwood etc) and the new NFV curve cuts the NAV curve below the intersection 
of NAV with MC. Secure agriculture occurs up to D1, open access agriculture 
from D1 to D2 and the distance D2-D3 is degraded forest. It is degraded because 
the marginal cost of protection lies above the NFV curve. Note that in neither of 
the first two cases does a managed forest sector emerge. 
 
In Figure A3.3 NFV shifts further to the right with the intersection of NFV and 
NAV lying above the intersection of NAV and MC. Up to D1 there is secure 
agriculture. Between D1 and D2 now there is a sustainable forest sector since 
forestry is the highest use value of that land and the MC of protection lies below 
the NFV curve. From D2 to D4 forest values dominate other uses, but the MC of 
protection is above the NFV curve. Hence D2D4 is degraded open access forest 
land, some of which may be used for agriculture. 
 
The essence of the analysis is that it matters at what stage one is for policy 
purposes. In stages 1 and 2, a sustainable forest sector is not likely to develop. In 
stage 3 it is. As the NFV curve shifts outward, so the residual ‘natural’ forest is 
increasingly invaded, i.e. deforestation occurs. In cases 1 and 2 certain familiar 
forest policies will not work, e.g. giving away seedlings or some other form of 
subsidy. Measures to lower the marginal cost of protection can result in 
sustainable forestry (moving from case 2 to case 3) and might be typified by 
policies design to ensure community control of forests.  
 
We can now introduce non-market values. The NFV curve in A2.1-3 are 
‘exploitative’ curves, i.e. they involve forest uses that destroy the forest, with the 
exception of the sustainable forest section of NFV in Figure A3.3. Some non-
market values can be realised only if the forest is protected and not used in an 
exploitative way. Carbon storage (as opposed to sequestration by growing trees) 
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would be the obvious example and biodiversity might be another. Suppose that 
these values are large relative to other values, including timber values, as is 
suggested by Pearce (1998). For convenience suppose that they are also constant 
across all forest, which would be the case for carbon but is unlikely for bio-
diversity. Then the NMFV curve in Figure A3.4 shows this value curve lying 
above other curves apart from a section of NAV. This suggests that secure 
agriculture would be practiced up to D1, whilst D1D2 would be sustainable 
forestry inclusive of carbon and biodiversity, and D2 onwards would be residual 
unprotected forest. The effect of the non-market values is therefore to greatly 
expand the sustainable forest sector, assuming, of course, that the non-market 
values are realised by, for example, international transfers such as carbon trades, 
GEF involvement, heritage financing etc.  
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Figure A3.3 
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